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Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts, and the 
Law of Democracy 
JOSHUA A. DOUGLAS * & MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE** 
As recent partisan gerrymandering cases have shown, three-judge dis-
trict courts play a unique and important role in how the federal judiciary 
considers significant election law disputes. Yet two somewhat quirky pro-
cedural questions involving these courts remain unresolved: first, is a 
Supreme Court ruling to summarily affirm a three-judge district court’s 
decision precedential on all future courts? That is, why should a one-line 
order from the Supreme Court, without explanation, formally bind all 
future courts on the issue, especially when it is unclear what aspect of 
the lower court’s decision was correct? Second, must a three-judge dis-
trict court follow, as mandatory authority, circuit precedent in the circuit 
in which it sits, even though an appeal from the ruling of a three-judge 
district court will skip the court of appeals and go directly to the U.S. 
Supreme Court? 
This Article tackles these problems and provides clear-cut answers, 
which will ultimately improve judicial decisionmaking for some of the 
most important cases that the federal judiciary hears given their effect on 
democracy. On the first question, we find that summary decisions of the 
U.S. Supreme Court are entitled to zero or very little precedential value, 
and therefore that the Justices need not feel obliged to hear these cases 
in full if they want the issue to percolate in the lower courts first. Yet 
there should be a presumption in favor of the Court providing legal guid-
ance on the issue, meaning that most of the time it should set the case for 
oral argument and provide a full written opinion. On the second ques-
tion, we conclude that circuit precedent is not formally binding on three- 
judge district courts, although of course in many cases it will be highly 
persuasive. 
Procedural questions stemming from three-judge district courts 
impact their substantive rulings, which mostly involve redistricting and 
campaign finance. Resolving these two questions on the procedures 
involving three-judge district courts will help to ensure that these special 
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courts operate as Congress intended, ultimately improving our electoral 
system.   
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INTRODUCTION 
During the 2017 Supreme Court Term, the Justices heard two cases on partisan 
gerrymandering that most of them probably would have preferred to avoid. The 
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cases, Gill v. Whitford1 and Benisek v. Lamone,2 included complex facts, politi-
cally charged discourse, and little clarity—the kinds of disputes the Court often 
would refuse to hear, at least until lower courts had more fully vetted the legal 
issues.3 Both cases involved challenges to egregious partisan gerrymanders: Gill 
attacked the entire Wisconsin state legislative map, which Republicans had gerry-
mandered to favor their side;4 Benisek presented a challenge to one congressional 
district in Maryland’s map, which Democrats had gerrymandered to remove 
Republican control of that district.5 The cases presented a significant clash 
between law and politics, and any decision on the merits would likely make the 
Court look political, something it purportedly abhors. 
During the oral argument in Gill, Chief Justice Roberts lamented that if the 
Court invalidated Wisconsin’s map as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, 
“there will naturally be a lot of these claims raised around the country. . . . And 
every one of them will come here for a decision on the merits.”6 According to 
Chief Justice Roberts, this fact would lead the Court to look too political and 
harm its institutional legitimacy.7 Given these concerns, why did the Court not 
simply decline to consider these disputes, as it does with the vast majority of other 
appeals? In both cases, the Court essentially punted on the substantive issues, dis-
missing Gill for lack of standing and affirming the denial of a preliminary injunc-
tion in Benisek while providing little guidance on the underlying issues.8 Why, 
then, did the Court bother at all? 
The answer is that the cases did not come to the Court through its normal dis-
cretionary certiorari jurisdiction. Instead, both Gill and Benisek involved direct 
appeals to the Supreme Court from three-judge district courts.9 The Court had no 
choice but to hear the cases.10 Chief Justice Roberts’s concern was that if the 
Court recognized a claim for partisan gerrymandering, then all of these cases 
would reach the Supreme Court on mandatory direct appeal, not via the Court’s 
discretionary certiorari jurisdiction where the Court could avoid ruling on them. 
Under federal law, when three-judge district courts hear cases such as Gill and 
Benisek, a losing party may appeal directly to the Supreme Court, skipping the 
court of appeals.11 Thus, in Gill and Benisek, because the losing parties appealed 
the decisions, the Court had to do something with respect to the cases. Unlike a 
denial of certiorari, refusing to hear them would have been tantamount to a 
1. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
2. 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018) (per curiam). 
3. For a discussion of the factors the Justices typically consider when deciding whether to grant or 
deny certiorari, see STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 238–74 (10th ed. 2013). 
4. 138 S. Ct. at 1922–24. 
5. 138 S. Ct. at 1943. 
6. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36–37, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161). 
7. See id. at 37–38. 
8. See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1931; Benisek, 138 S. Ct. at 1945. 
9. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court); Benisek v. 
Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799, 800 (D. Md. 2017) (three-judge court). 
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012). 
11. Id. 
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summary affirmance on the merits, which lower courts likely would have consid-
ered to have at least some precedential value. Instead, the Court took a middle 
ground in Gill and Benisek, hearing them on the merits but providing little guid-
ance on the doctrine of partisan gerrymandering beyond saying in Gill that plain-
tiffs must demonstrate individual harm from a map in a specific district.12 The 
Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing for their statewide challenge 
but otherwise provided no analysis on the appropriate standard for a partisan ger-
rymandering claim.13 Justice Kagan, concurring for herself and three other 
Justices in Gill, offered a roadmap for plaintiffs looking to bring a successful 
claim in the future.14 Her proffered analysis can help the doctrine evolve for the 
next partisan gerrymandering case—which the Court will once again be forced to 
consider on direct appeal. But the per curiam opinion in Benisek, affirming the 
denial of a preliminary injunction against Maryland’s map, provides no help at all 
to future cases because it rested on purely procedural grounds.15 
In fact, the Benisek opinion reads like a summary affirmance, although the 
Court at least provided some reasoning for its decision. Yet sometimes the Court 
will not even give full briefing or oral hearing to cases on direct appeal, instead 
summarily affirming them without explanation. In doing so, the Court creates 
precedent without saying what that precedent is. 
As Gill and Benisek show, the three-judge district court is a unique and colorful 
component of the federal court system.16 Almost all cases in federal court are 
adjudicated in the familiar way before one district judge at the trial level, with 
review thereafter by a three-judge panel of a U.S. Court of Appeals, followed (in 
a small percentage of those cases) by discretionary, certiorari review in the U.S. 
Supreme Court.17 The three-judge district court, which Congress created in 1910 
and amended substantially in 1937 and 1976,18 departs from this pattern in sev-
eral ways. Three judges—usually two district judges and one appellate judge— 
hear the case at the trial level, and any appeal bypasses the court of appeals and is 
lodged directly with the Supreme Court, which at least ostensibly must decide the 
case on the merits.19 
12. See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1932. 
13. See id. 
14. See id. at 1934–41 (Kagan, J., concurring) (discussing the ways a plaintiff could show an invalid 
partisan gerrymander, either through packing and cracking or based on a First Amendment infringement 
on the right of association). 
15. Benisek, 138 S. Ct. at 1944–45. 
16. See Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 
433, 433, 456 (discussing the situations in which Congress provided for three-judge district courts). 
17. Id. at 455–56. 
18. Act of June 18, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-218, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
2281) (repealed 1976); Act of Aug. 24, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-352, ch. 754, § 3, 50 Stat. 751, 752 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2282) (repealed 1976); Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, §§ 2, 3, 90 Stat. 
1119 (repealing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282); id. § 3 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2284) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 
2284). 
19. For further detail on the history and operation of the three-judge district court, see infra Part I. 
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The mechanism of three-judge district courts with direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court introduces two distinct questions of precedent. The first question is whether 
the Supreme Court’s decision to summarily affirm (or reverse) a three-judge dis-
trict court has any precedential effect. Other than binding the parties to the 
appeal, the precedential weight of these summary dispositions has long been 
unclear, although most observers believe that they are precedential to at least 
some extent.20 The second question asks whether precedent from a circuit court 
formally binds a three-judge district court from that circuit. A circuit court does 
not review the decision of a three-judge district court because the appeals process 
skips over the court of appeals. Should the circuit’s precedents bind a three-judge 
district court that is not subject to the circuit’s oversight? 
On the first question, this Article advocates for the Court to hear direct appeals 
in full from three-judge district courts, rather than issue summary rulings without 
any explanation that may or may not be binding on future lower courts. The 
Court should fulfill its institutional role in giving full consideration to these 
appeals, as Congress intended in creating the direct appeal procedure from three- 
judge district courts. Assuming, however, that the Justices do not want to give 
full review to a particular case from a three-judge district court, the Court should 
be able to designate a summary ruling as nonprecedential, at least when the Court 
refuses to provide its rationale. Why force the Court’s hand to set out binding 
precedent when it would rather let the issue percolate in the lower courts, espe-
cially in these highly charged political cases? The current middle ground of issu-
ing a summary decision (typically an affirmance) that is precedential without 
providing any explanation or reasoning creates unnecessary confusion for lower 
courts and litigants. Judges on future three-judge district courts, and lawyers who 
appear before them, must somehow discern which part of the lower court’s deci-
sion that the Supreme Court summarily affirmed was correct. Was it just the dis-
position or some of the reasoning as well? 
The second question—does circuit precedent bind three-judge district 
courts?—considers a less noticed anomaly of practice in such courts. The con-
ventional rules for hierarchical precedent are well settled. District courts must 
follow precedent from the circuit in which they sit but are not obliged to adhere 
to decisions of other circuits.21 Of course, all courts must follow precedent 
from the Supreme Court, but the Court denies most petitions for certiorari,22 
and it is firmly established that such denials are entitled to no precedential 
weight as they express no “opinion upon the merits of the case.”23 
20. See infra Section II.A. 
21. Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 817, 824–25 (1994). 
22. See, e.g., SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 237 (showing that the Court granted just 4.7% of 
certiorari petitions in the 2010 Term); The Supreme Court, 2017 Term: The Statistics, 132 HARV. L. 
REV. 447, 455 (2018) (showing that the Court granted just 4% of certiorari petitions in the 2017 Term). 
23. North Carolina v. N.C. State Conference of NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399, 1400 (2017) (mem.) 
(Roberts, C.J., statement respecting denial of certiorari) (quoting United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 
490 (1923)). 
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The rules of precedent for three-judge district courts, by contrast, are much 
less clear. Most three-judge district courts state that they are obliged to follow 
precedent from the circuit in which they sit, like all other district courts in the cir-
cuit, but offer little reasoning for this proposition.24 But other three-judge district 
courts do not find themselves so bound, on the theory that the three-judge district 
court operates outside of the usual hierarchical structure: appeals from those 
courts go directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the courts of appeals.25 This 
difference between theories can be consequential given the common phenom-
enon of circuit splits.26 
Thus, the rules of precedent are unclear for three-judge district courts from 
both descending and ascending perspectives. What precedential weight, if any, 
should all lower federal courts give to the Supreme Court’s summary disposi-
tions? And must three-judge district courts follow circuit precedent? Comment- 
ators have delved somewhat into the first issue of the precedential weight of 
Supreme Court summary dispositions, but the Court itself has been mostly equiv-
ocal.27 Scholars have acknowledged, but not explored, the second question on 
whether three-judge district courts must follow circuit precedent.28 
This Article adds clarity to these debates and suggests their proper resolution. 
Part I recounts the history and present status of three-judge district courts. It high-
lights how, after congressional amendments to the three-judge district court stat-
ute in the 1970s, direct appeals of these cases have become a small part of the 
Supreme Court’s overall docket but a significant portion of its election law 
caseload. 
The remainder of this Article accepts the reality of the three-judge district court 
mechanism for certain cases, and instead of questioning their efficacy or sound-
ness, seeks to improve their operation. In doing so, Part II addresses the first puz-
zle: what precedential weight should all courts give to the Supreme Court’s 
summary dispositions of appeals from the decisions of three-judge district courts? 
We conclude that these summary decisions are entitled to zero or little preceden-
tial value, and therefore, the Justices need not feel obliged to hear these cases in 
24. See, e.g., Parker v. Ohio, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1105 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (three-judge court) 
(offering the view that, even as a three-judge district court, “we are bound by precedent in this circuit”); 
see also infra Section III.A. 
25. See, e.g., Jehovah’s Witnesses in Wash. v. King Cty. Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 504–05 (W.D. 
Wash. 1967) (three-judge court), aff’d, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (noting that as a “special three-judge 
court . . . we are not bound by any judicial decisions other than those of the United States Supreme 
Court”); see also infra Section III.A. 
26. The Seton Hall Circuit Review publishes an annual list of current circuit splits. See, e.g., Current 
Circuit Splits, 13 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 275 (2017) (discussing approximately twenty circuit splits 
between August 1, 2016 and December 31, 2016). 
27. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 307–08 (“It thus seems fair to say that the whole Court 
agrees that summary dispositions are entitled to some weight, but to less than fully articulated decisions. 
. . . Just what [such] dispositions hold has presented a problem for the lower courts.”); see infra Section 
II.A. 
28. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 21, at 825 n.31 (suggesting that “[n]umerous 3-judge district 
courts follow their local court of appeals’ precedents even though only the Supreme Court may review 
their decisions”). 
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full if they want the issues to percolate in the lower courts first. They can simply 
summarily decide the case and bind only the litigants with an explicit statement 
to that effect. Yet there should be a presumption in favor of the Court providing 
legal guidance on the issue; that is, most of the time, the Court should set the case 
for oral argument and provide a full written opinion. This procedure will free the 
Court from hearing in full all direct appeals of cases from three-judge district 
courts, reserving its pronouncements for when it affirmatively chooses to resolve 
the underlying legal issues. 
Part III addresses the other precedential puzzle: must three-judge district courts 
apply precedent from the circuit in which they sit? We conclude that three-judge 
district courts have no such obligation and can give all circuit precedent the 
weight they deem appropriate. That is, circuit precedent is not formally binding 
on three-judge district courts, although in many cases it will be highly persuasive. 
In making these arguments, we do not mean to suggest that three-judge district 
courts are the most optimal tribunals for these cases, but only to say that, given 
their existence, the courts’ current practice regarding precedent is untenable. 
The three-judge district court procedure is a small part of the federal judi-
ciary’s docket, yet it plays a significant role because these courts handle cases 
involving redistricting and campaign finance, which are two highly charged 
issues that greatly impact participatory democracy. In fact, the issues that three- 
judge district courts resolve are often the most contentious and heated of any 
Supreme Court Term given their importance to the very operation of our demo-
cratic structure. Resolving how precedent works for these courts is therefore vital 
to ensure that the judiciary can properly adjudicate these disputes, ultimately 
helping our electoral system to function as fairly as possible. 
I. HISTORY AND OPERATION OF THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS 
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS 
The three-judge district court has existed, in one form or another, since 1910.29 
Congress enacted the three-judge district court to hear constitutional challenges 
to state statutes.30 The procedure was a reaction to the Supreme Court’s 1908 de-
cision in Ex parte Young, in which the Court invalidated Progressive Era legisla-
tion regulating railroad rates.31 The theory behind the three-judge district court 
was that a single federal judge should not have the power to invalidate a state 
law; “[i]nstead, any such decision would be better discussed and decided by three 
federal judges, at least one of whom was a court of appeals judge, and perhaps 
even better received by the interested public.”32 Additionally, skipping the court 
of appeals stage and allowing a direct appeal to the Supreme Court would 
29. Act of June 18, 1910, Pub. L. No. 218, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2281) (repealed 1976). 
30. Id. 
31. 209 U.S. 123, 148 (1908); see Michael E. Solimine, The Fall and Rise of Specialized Federal 
Constitutional Courts, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 124 (2014). 
32. Solimine, supra note 31, at 124. 
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produce a faster resolution on the constitutionality of a state statute, which was 
important to those concerned about the propriety of federal court encroachment 
upon state sovereignty.33 
Congress expanded the three-judge district court in 1937 to apply to constitu-
tional challenges to all laws rather than just state statutes.34 The amended three- 
judge district court was a minor outgrowth of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
Court-packing plan, in which Roosevelt sought to reshape the Supreme Court to 
uphold various aspects of his New Deal legislation.35 The idea to pack the Court 
failed, but Congress passed another part of the plan in 1937: the adoption of the 
three-judge district court for constitutional challenges to federal legislation.36 
The theory was that an injunction against a federal statute was as significant as 
one against a state statute, such that a single federal judge should not have the 
sole power to enjoin a federal enactment.37 
The three-judge district court comprised a significant portion of federal courts’ 
work, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, and at times appeals from these courts 
contributed up to a third of the Supreme Court’s docket.38 Critics complained 
about both the administrative difficulty of convening three judges for a district 
court panel and the mandatory Supreme Court review of these courts’ decisions.39 
Congress acquiesced in 1976, abolishing the three-judge district court for all but 
a few substantive areas.40 
Today, federal law requires three-judge district courts only for redistricting 
cases involving congressional or statewide reapportionments,41 certain campaign 
finance challenges,42 lawsuits under other statutes that Congress has found would 
benefit from the special three-judge district court procedure,43 and a few laws 
33. See id. at 124–25; see also Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex parte Young, and the Fate of the 
Three-Judge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 114 (2008) (noting the “relatively rapid” 
progression of the case). 
34. Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, § 3, 50 Stat. 751, 752 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2282) (repealed 
1976). 
35. See Solimine, supra note 31, at 123–24; see also Felix Frankfurter & Adrian S. Fisher, The 
Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HARV. L. REV. 577, 610–15 
(1938) (discussing the interrelationship of the 1937 expansion of the three-judge district court’s 
jurisdiction and the failed Court-packing plan). 
36. Solimine, supra note 31, at 123–24. 
37. Id. at 125 (noting argument that “litigation attacking Acts of Congress should be of ‘equal 
dignity’ to suits covered by the three-judge district court and share in the presumed benefits of that 
court” (quoting David P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 11 (1964))). 
38. Id. at 126. 
39. Id. at 134–37. 
40. Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, §§ 2, 3, 90 Stat. 1119 (repealing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 
2282). 
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2012) (“A district court of three judges shall be convened when otherwise 
required by Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the 
apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.”). 
42. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a), 116 Stat. 81, 113. 
43. Statutes that fall into this category “include the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
(Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) Act of 1985, [Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 274(a), 99 Stat. 1037, 1098] the Cable 
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involving the appointment of sitting members of Congress to cabinet positions.44 
Members of Congress who supported the use of three-judge district courts for 
these cases believed that having three judges decide the disputes from the outset 
would better protect important rights, such as the right to vote.45 
Redistricting cases now comprise the bulk of three-judge district court adjudi-
cation, although campaign finance cases using this procedure also continue to be 
influential.46 Indeed, some of the most controversial redistricting and campaign 
finance cases of the past decade—including McConnell v. FEC,47 Citizens United 
v. FEC,48 Evenwel v. Abbott,49 and Abbott v. Perez50—arose from three-judge dis-
trict courts. 
B. MECHANICS OF THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS 
Congress mandated specific requirements for the operation of three-judge dis-
trict courts. A party initiating a lawsuit that would qualify for a three-judge 
Television Consumer Protection and [Competition] Act of 1992, [Pub. L. No. 102-885, § 23, 106 Stat. 
1460, 1500] the Communications Decency Act of 1996, [Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 561, 110 Stat. 133, 
142–43] . . . and the census reform legislation passed in 1998 [Departments of Commerce, Justice, and 
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 209(e), 
111 Stat. 2440, 2482].” Solimine, supra note 31, at 130. 
More recently, several members of Congress included the three-judge district court mechanism in 
their bipartisan legislative proposal to protect a special counsel from being fired. See Special Counsel 
Independence and Integrity Act, S. 2644, 115th Cong. § 2(e)(2) (2018). 
44. These laws involve the so-called “Saxbe Fix,” which Congress enacted in response to President 
Nixon’s nomination of then-Senator William Saxbe for Attorney General. Opponents argued that the 
appointment would violate the Constitution’s Emoluments Clause because Saxbe had voted for an 
increase in the salary and benefits for the office to which he was appointed. See Solimine, supra note 31, 
at 131. 
45. See S. REP. NO. 94-204, at 7–9 (1975), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1988, 1996 (“[I]t is the 
judgment of the committee that [issues such as legislative apportionment] are of such importance that 
they ought to be heard by a three-judge court.”). Congress also included a mechanism for three-judge 
district courts in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in part to better protect civil rights. See H.R. REP. NO. 88- 
914, at 2125 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2490–91 (additional views of Rep. 
McCulloch et al. noting that “[s]ingle judges have in some instances refused to act in the face of 
convincing evidence” and that three judges would provide a “balance and broad range of views” and 
therefore a “greater willingness to safeguard the individual’s right to vote”).  
46. Until the Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), which invalidated 
the preclearance formula of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), three-judge district courts were also 
convened in declaratory judgment actions under section 5 of the VRA by covered jurisdictions seeking 
preclearance of any voting changes. See 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (2012) (“Any action under this section 
shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 
2284 of title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.”). 
This provision is still on the books, but without a coverage formula, no jurisdictions are subject to 
section 5’s preclearance requirement, meaning that this use of the three-judge district court is currently 
obsolete unless a court decides to “bail in” a particular jurisdiction under the rarely-used Section 3 of the 
VRA after a finding of intentional discrimination. Edward K. Olds, Note, More Than “Rarely Used”: A 
Post-Shelby Judicial Standard for Section 3 Preclearance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2185, 2188 (2017); see, 
e.g., Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (three-judge court) (deciding whether to apply 
the remedy of preclearance under section 3(c) of the VRA). 
47. 540 U.S. 93, 132 (2003). 
48. 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). 
49. 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1125 (2016). 
50. 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2313 (2018). 
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district court must file a request with the district judge to convene the special 
court.51 The single district judge determines whether “three judges are not 
required.”52 The Supreme Court recently clarified this statement to mean simply 
that the judge must “first examin[e] the allegations in the complaint” to ensure 
that the case qualifies under the statute and that there is federal jurisdiction.53 If 
the case qualifies—because, for example, it is a redistricting dispute involving a 
congressional or statewide apportionment—then the judge must notify the chief 
judge of the circuit.54 The chief judge will then appoint two other judges, one of 
whom must be a circuit judge, to join the initial district judge on the three-judge 
district court panel.55 The original judge may conduct pretrial proceedings and 
enter preliminary orders but may not render a decision on the merits or grant a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.56 The three-judge district court 
panel acts as a trial court, making findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Final judgments of the three-judge district court are appealable directly to the 
Supreme Court, skipping the intermediate court of appeals stage.57 The Court 
may then “note probable jurisdiction,”58 meaning that it will conduct a full hear-
ing, or summarily affirm or reverse, “but either way the Supreme Court must 
decide the dispute” on the merits.59 
Appeals from the decisions of three-judge district courts have represented a 
significant portion of the Supreme Court’s election law docket. From 2000 to 
2015, nearly half of the Court’s sixty election law cases came on mandatory  
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1) (2012). 
52. Id. 
53. Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 455 (2015). In the interest of full disclosure, we note that 
we jointly filed an amicus brief in Shapiro supporting the petitioners. 
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1). 
55. Id. The chief judge has full discretion to choose the other two judges—usually one circuit judge 
and one district judge—to comprise the three-judge district court. Although it is theoretically possible 
that the chief judge might select judges with ideology in mind, we are not aware of any studies that 
systematically examine whether this bias occurs in practice. There is some evidence that some 
“stacking” of three-judge district court panels took place in the Fifth Circuit in the 1950s and early 
1960s, purportedly to avoid permitting some conservative district judges from serving on desegregation 
cases. For further discussion, see Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights 
Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 110–11 (1996). For that article, Professor Solimine contacted 
the chief judges of each of the circuits responsible for selecting the remaining two members of the 
courts. Of those chief judges or circuit executives who responded, most indicated that chief judges 
would assign judges from the state in question, and although some indicated that chief judges would take 
into account some kind of political “balance,” there was no evidence in the responses of “stacking” or 
“packing” the panels. Id. at 113 (describing and reporting the results of the survey). 
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(3); Shapiro, 136 S. Ct. at 455. 
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012). 
58. SUP. CT. R. 18.12. 
59. Douglas, supra note 16, at 456. Sometimes the Court will “postpone” the consideration of 
jurisdiction while still agreeing to hear the case, as it did in Gill, the partisan gerrymandering case from 
Wisconsin. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1926 (2018) (noting that the Court “stayed the District 
Court’s judgment and postponed consideration of [its] jurisdiction”). 
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review from three-judge district courts.60 
The unique procedures of three-judge district courts raise two fundamental 
questions about their operation.61 First, are the Supreme Court’s summary rulings 
on appeals from three-judge district courts binding precedent on lower courts? 
Second, must these courts follow appellate court decisions in the circuit in which 
they sit? These procedural questions go to the heart of how three-judge district 
courts function, giving them outsized importance for the underlying substantive 
issues—especially on redistricting and campaign finance—that these courts 
resolve. The remainder of the Article provides some answers, explaining why we 
should not consider the Supreme Court’s summary dispositions as precedential, 
except in a very limited way, and why prior circuit precedent should not bind 
three-judge district courts. 
II. THE PRECEDENTIAL WEIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT’S SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS OF 
APPEALS FROM THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS 
Under the statute that creates three-judge district courts, the losing party may 
appeal their decisions directly to the Supreme Court.62 On its face this procedure 
is different from the typical process involving a writ of certiorari, through which 
the Court can simply deny the petition without creating new precedent. 
In the normal case involving an appeal from a circuit court of appeals or state 
supreme court, the losing party below seeks a writ of certiorari, which asks the 
Supreme Court to review the dispute. The Court has full “judicial discretion”63 on 
whether to set the case for briefing and oral argument; Supreme Court practice 
requires four of the nine Justices to grant the writ and hear a case.64 The Court 
will take a case “only for compelling reasons,” such as the presence of a circuit 
60. Douglas, supra note 16, at 458; Richard L. Hasen, Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s 
First Decade: A Sharp Right Turn but with Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 
1621 (2016). 
61. The purpose of this Article is not to question the propriety of three-judge district courts. We have 
done so previously in other articles. For instance, one of us has highlighted the benefits and 
disadvantages of these courts: 
Three-judge district courts, with direct review to the Supreme Court, ultimately have some 
virtues that are important in election law cases: quick resolution, an air of greater accuracy 
and legitimacy, and the symbolism of increased scrutiny for particularly important cases, to 
name a few. But they also have less desirable features, such as forcing the Supreme Court to 
decide an issue earlier than it may wish, a misallocation of tasks in the judicial decision- 
making process, and the possible perpetuation of the view that ideology drives the decisions,  
Douglas, supra note 16, at 467. Our focus here, instead, is to propose solutions to assist the operation of 
these courts given that they exist. 
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012). 
63. SUP. CT. R. 10. 
64. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 560 (1957) (Harlan, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (explaining that “the whole philosophy of the ‘rule of four,’ . . . is that any 
case warranting consideration in the opinion of such a substantial minority of the Court will be taken and 
disposed of”). The Rule of Four is not found in a formal Supreme Court Rule, but rather is a reflection of 
long-standing Court practice. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 325–29 (discussing Rule of Four in 
certiorari decisions); id. at 364–65 (same for direct appeals). 
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split or an important question of federal law.65 A denial of certiorari—the fate of 
most such requests—says nothing about the underlying merits of the decision and 
has no precedential effect.66 
The procedure for an appeal of a three-judge district court decision, however, 
is different. Because an appeal from a three-judge district court to the Supreme 
Court is the only permitted appeal for that litigation, the Court is under some obli-
gation to resolve it on the merits.67 The Court first determines whether it should 
consider the case fully, which would include further briefing and an oral argu-
ment.68 To do so, the Court will “note probable jurisdiction,”69 which seems simi-
lar to how the Court grants a writ of certiorari.70 If the Court decides not to give 
full consideration to the appeal, it will summarily affirm or reverse, almost 
always with a brief order to that effect but with no explanatory opinion accompa-
nying that order.71 Unlike a denial of certiorari, a summary disposition is ostensi-
bly “on the merits,” especially given that it is the only appeal available in the 
case.72 Thus, although the processes for denying certiorari and for summarily 
affirming the decision of a three-judge district court look similar, the effect of 
these orders is quite different: the denial of certiorari is not precedential at all, 
whereas a summary affirmance or reversal has some precedential weight. 
Yet it is not clear how much precedential weight, if any, the legal system 
should give to the Court’s supposedly “on the merits” summary dispositions of 
direct appeals from three-judge district courts. In this Part, we first canvass that 
confusing body of law. We then expound upon the problems with this approach 
and provide advice to the Court on how to reform its practice of summary disposi-
tions. We conclude that the Court should set more of these cases for full briefing 
and oral argument, but also suggest that if the Court wants to issue a summary 
disposition, it should make clear that its decision (and the decision of the three- 
judge district court under review) is not precedential and resolves only the precise 
dispute between the parties in that case. 
A. CURRENT JURISPRUDENTIAL STATUS OF SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS  
FROM THE SUPREME COURT 
In a judicial system with multiple levels, a losing party ordinarily may appeal 
to a higher court as of right, with an “appeal” suggesting full briefing, the poten-
tial of oral argument, and an explanatory opinion giving a rationale for a plenary 
disposition.73 In the federal system, in most cases a losing party at the district 
65. SUP. CT. R. 10. 
66. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 335–39. 
67. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 300 (by permitting “appeals,” Congress suggested “that the 
losing party may obtain review on the merits by a higher court as of right, not merely a discretionary 
determination as to whether the higher court will consider the case.”). 
68. SUP. CT. R. 18.12. 
69. Id. 
70. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 363–65. 
71. See id. at 365–67. 
72. Id. at 366. 
73. See id. at 300–01. 
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court may appeal, as of right, to the court of appeals.74 To reach the Supreme 
Court, the losing party case must file a writ of certiorari, which the Court has the 
discretion to accept or deny. 
Yet a small set of cases—those that arise from three-judge district courts— 
come to the Supreme Court via direct appeal from the district court.75 Under the 
federal statute that created these courts, a direct appeal to the Supreme Court is 
the only appeal allowed, which is why the Court does not have the discretion to 
avoid these cases and litigants have a right to this appeal.76 But the Supreme 
Court does not always give these cases full review. Instead, the Court often uses 
summary dispositions (usually affirmances) to resolve these direct appeals.77 The 
Court has defended its approach on the ground that only summary treatment is 
necessary because such cases lack a “substantial federal question” to decide.78 
This practice has made it difficult to discern what precedential weight future 
courts should afford to such dispositions. At one point, there appears to have been 
an understanding that lower courts should treat summary dispositions the same as 
denials of certiorari, that is, with no precedential value.79 
In several decisions from the 1970s, however, the Court departed from that 
understanding and held that summary affirmances of appeals, unlike certiorari 
denials, were “on the merits, entitled to precedential weight.”80 But the Court 
“immediately diluted the effect” of its pronouncement by stating “that [such] 
summary dispositions will not be accorded the full weight of decisions in which 
the issues were fully explored.”81 
In short, it “seems fair to say that the whole Court agrees that summary disposi-
tions are entitled to some weight, but to less than fully articulated decisions. . . . 
[T]he Justices feel less intellectual commitment to such decisions, even though 
they are a disposition on the merits.”82 In other words, the Court has tried to find a 
middle ground, giving some precedential value to summary dispositions, which 
74. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). 
75. Under various statutes, litigants used to file direct appeals to the Supreme Court in certain cases 
from single district judges and state supreme courts involving federal constitutional questions. Congress 
repealed those statutes in the 1970s and 1980s. By 1988, Congress left the three-judge district court as 
the only tribunal regularly supplying direct appeals to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 
2017 Term, The Statistics, 132 HARV. L. REV. 447, 457 (2018) (noting that of the sixty nine cases 
decided on the merits in the 2017 Term, only two came from direct appeals). 
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012). 
77. See, e.g., Republican Party of La. v. FEC, 219 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D.D.C. 2016) (three-judge court), 
aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 2178 (2017) (mem.); Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge 
court), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012) (mem.). 
78. See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343–45 (1975) (quoting Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 
360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959) (per curiam) (statement of Brennan, J.)); SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 
302–03. 
79. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 302–03. 
80. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367 n.16 (1975); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 
(1974) (stating that “summary affirmances obviously are of precedential value”). 
81. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 306 (citing Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 497 U.S. 916, 920 n.* 
(1990)). 
82. Id. at 307 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)). 
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are supposedly on the merits, but failing to accord them the same weight as other 
decisions that have a full opinion. 
Most of the Court’s decisions discussing the precedential weight of summary 
dispositions deal with how the Court itself should treat its own summary rulings. 
But the Court has made clear that lower courts should also consider such sum-
mary dispositions as precedential in the same way.83 In Hicks v. Miranda, for 
instance, the Court chastised a lower court for “disregard[ing]” a summary af-
firmance by noting, 
We were not obligated to grant the case plenary consideration, and we did not; 
but we were required to deal with its merits. We did so by concluding that the 
appeal should be dismissed because the constitutional challenge to the 
California statute was not a substantial one. The three-judge court was not free 
to disregard this pronouncement. As MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN once observed, 
“[v]otes to affirm summarily, and to dismiss for want of a substantial federal 
question, it hardly needs comment, are votes on the merits of a case . . . .”84 
Not surprisingly, given that the Court has been vague on the level of preceden-
tial weight these decisions should engender, lower courts have also expressed 
confusion as to what aspects of a summary decision they must follow.85 Without 
an explanatory opinion, it is unclear whether all or some of the Justices agreed on 
a rationale for affirming the lower court, or even what rationale sustained the de-
cision.86 The Court has unhelpfully stated that “[a] summary disposition affirms 
only the judgment of the court below, and no more may be read into our action 
than was essential to sustain that judgment.”87 This apparently means that the 
Court is not necessarily adopting the reasoning of the lower court when summar-
ily affirming.88 
But how can a lower court determine what was “essential” for the Supreme 
Court to sustain the judgment? The Supreme Court has stated that the lower court 
should assess the affirmance “in light of all of the facts” and compare those facts 
to the facts presented in the separate, new case to determine if the facts of the two 
cases are “very different.”89 This instruction seemingly means that the subsequent 
lower court should determine if the constitutional issues in the two cases are the 
same,90 though the scope of the required overlap between the two cases is elusive. 
To make this comparison, moreover, “lower court judges must have before them 
83. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 308 (discussing Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) and Tully 
v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68 (1976)). 
84. 422 U.S. at 344 (quoting Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959)). 
85. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 309–11 (discussing how uncertainty in Supreme Court 
decisions can lead to uncertainty in lower courts on the weight to be given to summary affirmances). 
86. Id. at 309. 
87. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 785 n.5 (1983). 
88. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 309 (citing Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391–92 (1975) 
(Burger, C.J., concurring)). 
89. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 177 (1977) (per curiam). 
90. Id. at 180 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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most if not all of the appeal papers in the earlier proceedings, and must not rely 
too much on the rationale expressed in the lower court opinions in the earlier 
cases.”91 Many judges and lawyers would “find this approach to prior Supreme 
Court summary actions both difficult and hazardous to follow.”92 As Justice 
Sotomayor wrote in dissent in a recent case involving whether the Court had ju-
risdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a three-judge district court, “[s]imple 
is thus the name of the game when it comes to jurisdictional rules.”93 Yet the cur-
rent approach of using summary dispositions without explanation is anything but 
simple. 
Some recent decisions illustrate well the implications of the Supreme Court’s 
summary disposition jurisprudence. In Cox v. Larios, the Court summarily 
affirmed an appeal from a three-judge district court in a reapportionment case 
involving the redrawing of state legislative lines.94 Prior Court decisions had left 
unclear how much and under what circumstances legislatures could deviate from 
strict mathematical one-person, one-vote equality in drawing state legislative dis-
tricts. Although not models of consistency, those prior cases arguably established 
that the one-person, one-vote principle allowed population deviances of up to ten 
percent, meaning that a deviation of less than ten percent was permissible.95 Yet 
the lower court in Cox struck down a state map in which the deviances were 
slightly less than ten percent,96 finding that such deviances existed for illegiti-
mate, strictly partisan grounds rather than for nonpolitical reasons, such as track-
ing the lines of existing political subdivisions.97 The Court summarily affirmed 
without a written explanation.98 The decision left the state of the law on ten per-
cent safe harbors unclear.99 Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion and 
Justice Scalia authored a dissent, exacerbating the lack of clarity from the Court’s 
decision given that the majority did not provide a rationale for its summary 
affirmance.100 
91. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 311. 
92. Id. 
93. Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2342 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
94. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004) (per curiam). 
95. See MICHAEL R. DIMINO ET AL., UNDERSTANDING ELECTION LAW AND VOTING RIGHTS 40–42 
(2017) (discussing Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 
(1973), Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), and Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969)). 
96. See Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1322 (finding that the reapportionment plan “deviates from the 
population equality by a total of 9.98% of the ideal district population”). 
97. See id. 
98. 542 U.S. at 947. 
99. See DIMINO ET AL., supra note 95, at 42; Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process, Agenda 
Setting, and the Development of Election Law on the Supreme Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 767, 792–93 
(2007). 
100. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in Cox on the basis that the actions by the 
state legislature amounted to impermissible partisan gerrymandering, reiterating a position he took in his 
dissent earlier that year in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cox, 542 
U.S. at 949–51 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Scalia dissented on the basis that partisan 
gerrymandering was nonjusticiable under his opinion for a plurality of the Court in Vieth, and that one- 
person, one-vote claims involving “minute population deviations” should not be permitted to 
masquerade as partisan gerrymandering claims. Id. at 951–52 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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A decade later, the Court in Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission briefly revisited the issue, explaining its decision in Cox by simply 
referring to the reasoning of the three-judge district court in that case.101 It 
appeared from Harris that by summarily affirming the three-judge district court’s 
decision in Cox, the Court had essentially adopted that court’s rationale— 
although the Court did not make this explicit or clear when it summarily affirmed 
the decision in Cox. The Court could have dispelled much of this confusion if it 
had given the appeal plenary treatment in the first instance, explained specifically 
what aspect of the lower court it was affirming, or directly stated that its summary 
affirmance was not precedential at all. 
Another example of the implications that arise from the Court’s summary dis-
position jurisprudence comes from the campaign finance world, where the Court 
is statutorily obliged to review three-judge district court decisions that consider 
constitutional challenges to various provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2003 (BCRA).102 The Court has given full consideration to a 
stream of challenges that initially went before three-judge district courts in the 
District of Columbia, complete with full explanatory opinions.103 But in at least 
two significant cases, the lower courts rejected the challenges and the Supreme 
Court summarily affirmed those decisions without explanation. One such case 
concerned the BCRA provision limiting federal election spending by foreign-
ers,104 while the other concerned the BCRA provision limiting “soft-money” 
campaign contributions to state and local political parties.105 In both cases, some 
observers argued that the summary dispositions were surprising because prior 
decisions striking down other BCRA provisions had arguably cast doubt on the 
constitutional validity of these parts of the law.106 
In response to Bluman, some observers felt that the broad rationale of Citizens United cast 
serious doubt on the provision excluding foreign contributions. See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United 
and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 605–10 (2011); Richard Hasen, Why Banning 
Russian Facebook Ads Might Be Impossible, POLITICO (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.politico.com/ 
magazine/story/2017/09/26/russian-facebook-ads-regulation-215647 [https://perma.cc/7QTG-PU3Z]. 
In response to the Republican Party case, some observers were surprised that the Court denied full 
review, because the provision in question was arguably unconstitutional given the rationale of Citizens 
United and other BCRA cases. See Kenneth P. Doyle, ‘Soft Money’ Rules Upheld by Supreme Court, 85 
U.S.L.W. 1607, 1607–08 (2017) (discussing views of noted election law litigator James Bopp). 
Yet the status of these two sum-
mary affirmances as precedential for future cases remains unclear. For such high- 
profile legal challenges involving important political issues, the Court should 
provide more than just a perfunctory summary affirmance. 
101. 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1310 (2016). The Court made no mention of the separate opinions in Cox. 
102. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a), 116 Stat. 81, 113. 
103. See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008), rev’g, 501 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 2007) (three 
judge court); Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (per curiam), vacating, 2004 WL 
3622736 (D.D.C. 2004) (three judge court). 
104. Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 
(2012) (mem.). 
105. Republican Party of La. v. FEC, 219 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D.D.C. 2016) (three-judge court), aff’d, 
137 S. Ct. 2178 (2017) (mem.). Justices Thomas and Gorsuch dissented from the summary affirmance 
and would have set the case for full argument. 137 S. Ct. at 2178. 
106. 
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In the remainder of this Part, we address why the Court should change its sum-
mary disposition practice and what the Court should do differently. 
B. WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD CHANGE ITS APPROACH TO SUMMARY 
AFFIRMANCES OF THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS 
The Supreme Court’s current summary disposition practice has inspired some 
forceful opposition—with which we ultimately agree. On the Court itself, for 
example, Justice William Brennan stated that if summary affirmances have any 
precedential weight, even if less than a full opinion, then “at a minimum we have 
the duty to provide some explanation of the issues presented in the case and the 
reasons and authorities supporting our summary dispositions.”107 Although 
Justice Brennan expressed his belief that this obligation existed for “every case,” 
he also made clear that the Court had a particular responsibility for cases “pre-
senting novel issues or where there is disagreement among us as to the grounds of 
the disposition.”108 
The leading treatise on Supreme Court practice echoes Justice Brennan’s posi-
tion on this issue.109 The treatise’s authors conclude that lower courts and the bar 
would benefit from further explanation, arguing that it would help, for example, 
if “instead of merely saying ‘affirmed,’ the Court briefly stated the ground for its 
ruling, or cited a case that would indicate the ground. Although this would make 
summary disposition slightly less summary, the additional understanding it would 
produce would reduce the amount of future litigation.”110 This benefit, they con-
tinue, “would likely outweigh the additional burden that would be imposed,” 
especially given the relatively few direct appeals that now go to the Court.111 
Sound institutional reasons support abolishing, or at least limiting, the use of 
precedential summary affirmances for direct appeals from three-judge district 
courts. Summary dispositions, which may or may not have precedential weight, 
have caused considerable confusion not only for the Court itself, but also for 
lower court judges and attorneys practicing before three-judge district courts. 
How should future litigants decipher the cryptic one-line decisions that are 
107. Colo. Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913, 922 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). 
108. Id. 
109. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 311. 
110. Id. Requiring the Supreme Court to provide some rationale for its decision is not likely to lead to 
much further delay because the Court decides all of its cases within a single Term running from October 
to June. Moreover, by skipping the court of appeals stage, the litigation is already streamlined, which 
was one of the goals behind Congress’s creation of three-judge district courts. See Douglas, supra note 
16, at 460–62 (showing how long it takes the Supreme Court to resolve appeals from three-judge district 
courts, ranging from about four months to a little over a year and a half). 
111. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 311. Relatedly, one commentator has expressed concerns with 
the Court’s frequent use of summary orders to dispose of requests for stays of lower court decisions 
concerning the death penalty, pending elections, and other cases needing rapid treatment. See William 
Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 3 (2015). But in 
many of those cases, there is a need for swift rulings and virtually no time to prepare even a short 
explanatory opinion (though the Court could release one later). In contrast, there is rarely such a need for 
swiftness to decide direct appeals in three-judge district court cases. 
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currently, and confusingly, described as being “on the merits?” Are they fully 
precedential, entitled to only some weight, or not precedential at all? 
Nevertheless, there are several possible reasons why the Court might choose to 
maintain the status quo of summarily affirming those cases in which it does not 
wish to provide more guidance. First, given the statutory changes in the 1970s 
and 1980s that limited the kinds of cases that warrant a three-judge district court, 
there are relatively few cases that arrive at the Supreme Court on direct appeal.112 
Thus, even if one concedes that the Court’s practice leads to jurisprudential con-
fusion, its approach concerns only a small number of cases and certainly far fewer 
than the large number of such cases and appeals in the 1960s and 1970s. These 
cases, however, go to the heart of representative democracy, so they are arguably 
different from other legal disputes, which is why Congress gave them a special 
procedure in the first place. Cases about democratic processes are sufficiently 
consequential that we should be concerned about the confusion that surrounds 
them. 
Second, one might defend the summary affirmance practice as a nod to the 
legal acumen of three lower federal court judges, meaning that another multi- 
member court need not spend as much time reviewing the lower court’s deci-
sion.113 Yet this same rationale might also apply to the Court’s denials of certio-
rari from three-judge appellate panels on the circuit courts, but those orders are 
not precedential. 
Third, as a practical matter, summary dispositions of direct appeals, like deni-
als of certiorari, may permit the Court to act strategically and dodge the need to 
confront directly a particularly controversial or politically charged issue.114 But 
treating a summary disposition as potentially precedential compromises that 
strategy. 
Fourth, the Court’s frequent invocation of the “narrow” construction it has 
given to the Three-Judge Court Act might also support its approach to summary 
dispositions of these appeals.115 Without apology, the Court has stated that a nar-
row construction is necessary to “minimize[e] the mandatory docket of this Court  
112. See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text. 
113. This rationale might ring true despite the fact that the formality of an “appeal” forces the Court 
to indulge the legal fiction that such dispositions are “on the merits.” Cf. Frederick Schauer, Giving 
Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 651—53 (1995) (linking explanations in judicial opinions with rule of 
law values). 
114. See generally Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative 
Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1, 17–18 (2016) (discussing denials of certiorari and other mechanisms where 
the Court, without explanation, can avoid confronting difficult or controversial issues). As one of us has 
suggested, the Court seems to suffer from “BCRA-fatigue” and may not wish to issue full opinions on 
the seemingly endless stream of constitutional challenges to various provisions of the BCRA. Solimine, 
supra note 99, at 779. See also Gonzalez v. Automatic Emps. Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 99 n.17 (1974) 
(stating that many three-judge district court cases that are summarily affirmed “would benefit from the 
normal appellate review”). 
115. Solimine, supra note 33, at 134–35, 140 (discussing the overtly narrow construction the Court 
gave to the statute). 
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in the interests of sound judicial administration.”116 The use of summary affir-
mances to decide direct appeals is consistent with that limited construction, inso-
far as it streamlines the Court’s involvement in these cases. But again, that 
cursory review is at odds with the special procedures Congress created for these 
kinds of cases, particularly those that affect elections. 
Finally, whether intended or not, perhaps the Court’s current practice of using 
summary affirmances has the virtue of signaling to lower courts that they may 
adopt reasonable but narrower readings of Court precedent, especially if that 
precedent comes from a summary disposition and not a full opinion. Such nar-
rowing may have social benefits when the Court’s precedents in question are ob-
solete or have had harmful consequences.117 This narrowing allows a middle 
ground between lower courts dogmatically applying Court precedent in all cir-
cumstances and the Court having to decide whether to overrule one of its own 
cases.118 The Court could summarily affirm, obliquely upholding a three-judge 
district court decision, without explicitly adopting its narrowing construction. 
Again, however, that narrowing from below comes at a cost: opacity in an area 
such as election law, where clarity is a virtue. 
C. REFORMING THE COURT’S SUMMARY DISPOSITION PRACTICE 
We agree with the reformers: the Court should eliminate its middle-ground, 
confusing position of issuing summary decisions while claiming that they have 
some (but perhaps not full) precedential weight. Instead, the Court should take 
one of two clearer paths: (1) either treat a direct appeal of a decision from a three- 
judge district court like a grant of certiorari and set the case for full briefing and 
116. Gonzalez, 419 U.S. at 98 (citing Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941)); see also Abbott 
v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018) (reiterating “that § 1253 must be strictly construed”). But see id. 
at 2335–37, 2339 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of not engaging in strict 
construction). 
117. See generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 
921 (2016) (providing an extended discussion and defense of this option). 
118. Professor Re does not discuss at any length how the institution of the three-judge district court, 
coupled with direct appeals, fits in the “narrowing from below” model. See id. Nonetheless, it is 
significant that he mentions, as a “classic example” of when “a lower court might predict that the higher 
court will overrule or otherwise set aside its own case law,” the case of Barnette v. West Virginia State 
Board of Education, 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. W. Va. 1942) (three-judge court), aff’d, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
Re, supra note 117, at 940 & n.91. The Supreme Court had previously held that public school students 
could be forced to salute the flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 
310 U.S. 586 (1940). Subsequently, the three-judge district court in Barnette, considering the same issue, 
held for the school children, predicting that the Supreme Court would overrule the previous case—as 
indeed it did on direct appeal. Barnette, 47 F. Supp. at 252–53; 319 U.S. at 642. 
A similar case is Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (three-judge court), rev’d, 401 
U.S. 37 (1971). There, the plaintiff challenged a state law that the Supreme Court had upheld in 1927 on 
First Amendment grounds. The three-judge district court held that later cases had effectively overruled 
the 1927 decision. 281 F. Supp. at 515–16. The Younger Court reversed on the ground that the lower 
court should have abstained in the case given that the issue could be resolved in ongoing state criminal 
litigation. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41–42. 
Both Barnette and Younger involve “overruling,” rather than merely “narrowing” from below, but 
both arguably illustrate how three-judge district courts might regard themselves as being able to take a 
more flexible view of precedent as compared to a single district judge. 
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oral argument, or (2) summarily decide the case while stating explicitly that the 
order is not precedential to any degree besides binding the parties in that 
litigation. 
There are strong arguments for a presumption that the Court should give ple-
nary consideration to all direct appeals of three-judge district court decisions, 
absent exceptional circumstances.119 This process would entail full briefing and 
consideration, with some explanatory decision to follow. The result of this full 
briefing and consideration could be either a traditional full opinion or a shorter 
decision, much like Justice Brennan contemplated.120 A short decision could 
explain the main basis of the Court’s decision or provide a case cite or two to sig-
nal what precedent dictated the outcome, thereby providing guidance for future 
three-judge district courts. The Court does not necessarily need to hold oral argu-
ment and two rounds of briefing in all such cases. 
In fact, the Court used this approach, to some extent, in Benisek v. Lamone, the 
2018 partisan gerrymandering case from Maryland, when it issued a five-page 
per curiam decision explaining the procedural basis for affirming the denial of a 
preliminary injunction.121 Instead of just summarily affirming the lower court’s 
holding, the Court provided a brief rationale for its decision, which will help 
three-judge district courts in the future when they face a request for a preliminary 
injunction to invalidate a map for the next election. Thus, one way to solve the 
current confusion regarding the precedential value of the Court’s summary dispo-
sitions is to adopt a presumption against summary dispositions.122 
Alternatively, given the potential administrative concerns, the Court itself may 
not look kindly upon a directive to consider these cases in full, leading to our sec-
ond suggestion: if the Court deems full hearings for all cases on appeal from 
three-judge district courts administratively impracticable, the Court should ex-
plicitly state that a summary disposition is not precedential and merely resolves 
the dispute before it. This practice would eliminate any concern that future courts 
or different litigants must rely upon the summary disposition, and it would 
119. See supra Section II.B. One special circumstance would be the necessity for affirming by an 
equally divided vote. See, e.g., Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980) (three-judge 
court), aff’d by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 129 (1982); see also Justin Pidot, Tie Votes in the 
Supreme Court, 101 MINN. L. REV. 245, 266–68 (2016) (indicating that there were eighteen ties in 
reviewing appeals from three-judge district courts from 1925 through 2015). 
120. See supra notes 107–08. 
121. 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018) (per curiam); see also North Carolina v. Covington, 138 S. Ct. 2548 
(2018) (per curiam) (providing several pages of explanation while summarily affirming in part and 
reversing in part). 
122. As long ago as the 1920s, the Court was explaining, albeit briefly, its rationale for a summary 
affirmance of an appeal from a three-judge district court. See, e.g., Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 
273 U.S. 657, 657 (1927) (“Affirmed on the authority of Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 
[(1923)].”); see also Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at 
October Term, 1929, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1930) (suggesting that the Court “indicate briefly” the 
“character of considerations . . . which govern its judgment”). There is no good reason why the present 
Court cannot similarly issue such short opinions. 
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unshackle the Court from having to give full consideration to an issue that it may 
want to let percolate among the lower courts. 
Chief Justice Roberts, in particular, may look more favorably upon our pre-
scription that summary decisions should have no precedential weight and would 
likely recoil at a suggestion that the Court hear more of these cases in full. In a 
recent oral argument, the Chief Justice indirectly expressed concern about the 
prospect of an increased number of direct appeals from three-judge district 
courts.123 He suggested that it is “a serious problem because there are a lot” of 
appeals in reapportionment cases from three-judge district courts.124 Ordinarily, 
he noted, the Court does not review all such cases but instead might allow an 
issue to “percolate” in the lower courts, but with an appeal from a three-judge dis-
trict court, the Court is bound “to decide it on the merits.”125 In light of these 
remarks, Chief Justice Roberts presumably would oppose our proposal for the 
Court to devote greater attention to virtually all such appeals. 
Although Chief Justice Roberts’s concerns about spending more time on these 
cases are not trivial, they are ultimately unconvincing. His unease with a potential 
avalanche of direct appeals might have carried more weight in the 1960s and 
1970s, when the Court was deciding twenty to thirty or even more direct appeals 
each Term in the midst of a workload of around 150 cases in total.126 Similar 
arguments about the Court’s caseload convinced Congress to curtail the jurisdic-
tion of three-judge district courts in 1976.127 This argument is much less convinc-
ing in the current era of a shrunken docket, where the Court hears around eighty 
cases each Term, with only a handful coming on direct mandatory appeal from 
three-judge district courts.128 To be sure, there are a significant—but not over-
whelming—number of reapportionment cases brought every time states redraw 
their federal and state legislative districts after a new census in the early part of a  
123. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015) (No. 14-990). 
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court in Shapiro, which concerned the standard a 
district judge, to whom the case is initially assigned, should apply when determining whether to convene 
a three-judge district court under the relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2284(a), (b). 136 S. Ct. at 453. The 
Court’s opinion makes no reference to the policy concerns the Chief Justice raised during the oral 
argument, and the Chief Justice did not submit a separate opinion. Indeed, the opinion, somewhat 
counter to the Chief Justice’s concerns, states: “Rare today, three-judge district courts were more 
common in the decades before 1976.” Id. (emphasis added). 
124. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Shapiro, 136 S. Ct. 450 (No. 14-990). 
125. Id. 
126. Solimine, supra note 55, at 138 (collecting data from the 1953 to 1993 Terms); see LEE EPSTEIN 
ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 88–90 (5th ed. 
2012). 
127. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text; see also Solimine, supra note 33, at 134–48 
(describing the successful campaign to limit the three-judge district court). 
128. For much of the 1960s and 1970s the Court was deciding up to 150 cases per Term. By the 
1990s that number fell to its present rate of around seventy or eighty cases per Term. See EPSTEIN ET AL., 
supra note 126, at 88–90. See generally Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme 
Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012) (discussing the causes and 
consequences of this decline). 
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decade.129 
There are typically legal challenges to the reapportionment of federal or state legislative 
districts brought in most states after each decennial redistricting. See, e.g., Litigation in the 2010 Cycle, 
ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases.php [https://perma.cc/7JS5-EXSV] (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2018). 
But not all of those cases result in a direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court, and of those that do, they often arrive at the Court spread out over several 
years. For example, in the 2016 Term the Supreme Court decided two cases that 
involved redistricting that occurred in 2011, after the 2010 census.130 The 2017 
Term included the two partisan gerrymandering cases, Gill and Benisek, and a 
racial gerrymandering case, Abbott v. Perez.131 Plainly, the workload from direct 
appeals is not overly burdensome. 
In addition, even while lamenting the mandatory nature of these direct appeals, 
the Justices themselves have noted that the caseload is not that large. In Abbott, 
the racial gerrymandering case from 2018, the Court held that it had jurisdiction 
over an appeal of an interlocutory injunction, noting that “appeals from such 
orders have not overwhelmed our docket.”132 Justice Alito wrote those words for 
the five-justice majority, which included Chief Justice Roberts, suggesting that 
the Chief has less concern about an increased caseload than he initially intimated. 
As the Court wrote, “[w]e appreciate our obligation to heed the limits of our juris-
diction, and we reiterate that § 1253 [the statute providing for direct appeals from 
three-judge district courts] must be strictly construed. But it also must be sensibly 
construed . . . .”133 A sensible construction requires the Court either to consider 
these appeals fully or, if it is unwilling to do so, to refrain from issuing a one-line 
opinion without explanation that lower courts must follow as binding precedent. 
Most importantly, Congress has made the policy decision to leave intact the 
three-judge district court, with its unusual direct appeal, for reapportionment and 
a small number of other cases.134 Keeping three-judge district courts for specific 
issues suggests that Congress wants the Court to continue hearing these disputes 
on direct appeal. Perhaps it was unwise to create such courts in the first instance, 
and maybe the conventional three-tiered path for all cases in federal court should 
cover reapportionment and other disputes now adjudicated before three-judge 
district courts.135 But it seems unlikely that, in today’s political environment, 
Congress has the appetite to reform this aspect of federal court jurisdiction. 
129. 
130. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017) (examining Virginia state 
legislative districts); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017) (examining North Carolina congressional 
districts). 
131. Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018); Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018) (per 
curiam); Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
132. Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2323. The Court was specifically referring to a district court “enjoin[ing] 
the use of districting plans before moving on to the remedial phase,” id., but we think its observation 
applies to all appeals from three-judge district courts in this context. 
133. Id. at 2324. Justice Sotomayor, in dissent, lamented that, in accepting the appeal in that case, 
“our mandatory appellate docket will be flooded by unhappy litigants in three-judge district court cases, 
demanding our review.” Id. at 2343 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
134. See supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text. 
135. Cf. Solimine, supra note 31, at 159–60 (concluding, after canvassing policy arguments in favor 
of and against three-judge district courts, that the latter arguments are more convincing). 
434 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:413 
Either way, that is a policy choice the Court should respect by following the rele-
vant statute and dealing with the direct appeals as actual appeals, not as substi-
tutes for certiorari.136 
Because of the inherent confusion in the Court’s current practice, if it is unwill-
ing to set these cases for full briefing and argument, with an explanatory opinion 
to follow, then as a next-best solution it should explicitly state in its summary 
opinions that the decisions carry no precedential weight and bind only the parties 
to the specific litigation. This practice would at least eliminate one confusing as-
pect of the current approach. A qualifying statement from the Court instructing 
lawyers and lower courts that they should not treat a summary affirmance as bind-
ing precedent would be similar to an “unpublished” opinion that a lower court 
may issue in a case that the court finds less worthy of publication. Although par-
ties may cite unpublished opinions as persuasive authority, a district court need 
not treat a circuit court’s unpublished decision as binding precedent.137 Allowing 
courts to designate certain opinions as “unpublished” and therefore not preceden-
tial arguably eases the court’s workload, allowing it to issue a perhaps less-than- 
polished opinion that resolves the dispute without worrying about the future 
precedential effects of that specific case.138 Whether that feature of appellate 
court practice actually helps judicial administration is perhaps debatable,139 but 
136. Given that, as we have been emphasizing, the relevant statutory language explicitly refers to an 
“appeal to the Supreme Court,” 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012), it might be argued that our second suggestion, 
permitting the Court to summarily rule but not to accord such ruling precedential weight, is in tension 
with the statutory language. The argument would be that such a diluted ruling is not what Congress 
contemplated when it referred to an “appeal” available for three-judge district courts. We disagree 
because there are examples of explained decisions on appeals that do not have precedential weight. 
Consider the common practice of not giving such weight to decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals that 
are not officially published. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. We concede that the analogy to 
officially unpublished decisions of the Courts of Appeals is not perfect. Any decision of the Supreme 
Court with even minimal explanation is likely to be considered of some significance. Nonetheless, the 
long-standing experience of the Courts of Appeals on this issue is worthy of the Supreme Court’s 
consideration. 
137. See, e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4 (“Unpublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996, are not 
precedent, except under the doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case (or similarly to 
show double jeopardy, notice, sanctionable conduct, entitlement to attorney’s fees, or the like).”); Anne 
Coyle, A Modest Reform: The New Rule 32.1 Permitting Citation to Unpublished Opinions in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2472–74, 2489–90 (2004) (surveying federal 
circuit rules on citation and precedential effect of unpublished opinions); Martha Dragich Pearson, 
Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1235, 1235–36 & nn.7–11 (2004) 
(surveying federal circuit rules negating or restricting precedential effect of unpublished opinions). 
138. See, e.g., Jeffrey O. Cooper, Citability and the Nature of Precedent in the Courts of Appeals: A 
Response to Dean Robel, 35 IND. L. REV. 423, 429 n.37 (2002) (“One of the most commonly-voiced 
rationales for unpublished opinions is that they free judges of the burden of producing polished, 
thoroughly-reasoned text.”); Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices 
in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 703 (2001) (explaining courts’ rationale for 
issuing an unpublished opinion as “the notion that, where a case is easily resolved on the basis of 
existing law, there is no need for the court to take the time to write a polished, published opinion because 
the case adds nothing new to the body of law, and there is no need for anyone to cite the court’s decision 
because other precedent exists to establish the pertinent point”). 
139. See, e.g., Kenneth F. Hunt, Note, Saving Time or Killing Time: How the Use of Unpublished 
Opinions Accelerates the Drain on Federal Judicial Resources, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 315, 332 (2011) 
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the efficacy of using unpublished opinions is irrelevant to our current inquiry. 
Instead, the important takeaway is that the federal judiciary already has a mecha-
nism to resolve a case without creating binding precedent, so the Court is well 
within the bounds of established judicial practice to adopt this method for the few 
cases it receives on direct appeal. 
Sound jurisprudential and institutional reasons support a presumption that the 
Court should hear all of these cases and issue an explanatory opinion in each one. 
But we are also realistic in acknowledging that the Court may not adopt this solu-
tion. In the alternative, the Court could cure at least one aspect of the current 
confusion by stating explicitly that summary dispositions of appeals from three- 
judge district courts are not actually precedential. That practice would represent a 
significant improvement over the current status quo.140 
D. REFORMING THE COURT’S NARROW CANON OF CONSTRUCTION OF THE  
THREE-JUDGE COURT ACT 
A corollary of our proposal should lead the Court to jettison its canon of strict 
and narrow construction of the three-judge district court statute. Currently, the 
Court applies a strict construction to almost all jurisdictional statutes, which often 
leads the Court to overtly or inferentially limit the number of cases that flow to 
the Court and the lower federal courts.141 Similarly, when construing the statute 
dealing with the three-judge district court, the Court has frequently engaged in an 
overt strict construction to reduce the number of times a three-judge district court 
needs to be convened and to limit direct appeals to the Court.142 Even when con-
ferring jurisdiction over an appeal from an interlocutory injunction—where the 
Court read the three-judge district court’s decision broadly as issuing an injunc-
tion even though the lower court did not use that word—the Court still said that it 
must “strictly construe” the statute.143 The Court might invoke this same narrow 
construction to justify the use of summary dispositions that may or may not be 
precedential.144 
But the Supreme Court has recently eschewed application of this narrow canon 
for jurisdictional statutes.145 In Shapiro v. McManus, the Court, in a unanimous 
(arguing that the system of unpublished opinions creates uncertainty for “consumers” of opinions and 
increases the amount of federal litigation). 
140. We acknowledge that under our proposal, summary affirmances without any precedential value 
may increase uncertainty in the lower courts regarding the proper disposition of reapportionment 
litigation, and may create more litigation and appeals to the Supreme Court. All of this is possible, but 
there is already substantial uncertainty under the present regime regarding how lower courts, and the 
Court itself, should interpret summary affirmances. On balance, we think it would clarify matters to strip 
those affirmances of any precedential value. It would also incentivize the Court to issue explanatory 
opinions to have a precedential effect. 
141. For an overview of this canon, see generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Jurisdiction Canon, 
70 VAND. L. REV. 499 (2017). Professor Bruhl does not expressly discuss the application of this canon to 
the three-judge district court context. 
142. See Solimine, supra note 33, at 134–35. 
143. Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018). 
144. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text. 
145. See Bruhl, supra note 141, at 521–25. 
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opinion by Justice Scalia (a noted textualist), studiously applied strict textual 
analysis to conclude that the jurisdictional statutes require the convening of the 
three-judge district court when a constitutional challenge to a reapportionment 
presents a substantial federal question.146 There was no mention of the strict inter-
pretation canon. Similarly, in Abbott, the Court recently conferred jurisdiction 
over an appeal from what it deemed to be an interlocutory injunction, even 
though the lower court explicitly disavowed that its opinion was an injunction.147 
The Court reiterated that it must construe the statute strictly while also explaining 
that it should apply a “sensible” construction to hear the case.148 Justice 
Sotomayor, in dissent, chastised the majority for abandoning a strict interpreta-
tion, which she said would result in more direct appeals.149 
Professor Aaron-Andrew Bruhl has argued persuasively that the legal system 
should evaluate the narrow construction canon (like other statutory construction 
canons) based on, among other things, its historical pedigree, as well as its rela-
tionship to constitutional values and congressional preferences.150 Applying these 
factors, the strict construction canon does not fare well in the present context. 
Strict construction certainly has historical pedigree; the Supreme Court overtly 
invoked a narrow construction of the three-judge district court statute as far back 
as 1928.151 But under the other factors, the narrow construction canon has no 
place when considering the three-judge district court statute. These courts hear 
contentious constitutional issues that underlie the foundation of our democracy, 
which Congress determined will benefit from a special tribunal. A strict construc-
tion of the jurisdictional statutes to limit the Court’s docket for these cases runs 
counter to this legislative judgment. Thus, the Court’s shrunken docket overall, 
congressional amendments in the 1970s, and the institutional characteristics of 
the modern three-judge district court—when considered together—demonstrate 
that the Court should not interpret the statute to limit its own jurisdiction over 
direct appeals. 
Minimizing summary dispositions in either direction—by hearing all of these 
cases or stating explicitly that they are not precedential—will not unduly burden 
the Court. The continued use of such dispositions is particularly indefensible in 
an era of a shrunken docket, where the Court hears around eighty cases a year and 
only a few of those involve direct appeals from three-judge district courts.152 A 
146. 136 S. Ct. 450, 454–56 (2015). 
147. Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2319 (2018). 
148. See id. at 2324. 
149. Id. at 2343 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
150. See Bruhl, supra note 141, at 503. 
151. See Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 567–69 (1928) (Brandeis, J.). See generally Solimine, supra 
note 33, at 134–35. Not coincidentally, the Court’s practice of summary dispositions of direct appeals 
goes back this far as well. See also Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 122, at 8–11 (discussing frequent 
use of summary disposition of direct appeals in the 1927 and 1928 Terms). 
152. See Owens & Simon, supra note 128, at 1225; cf. Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for 
Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (noting that the Court should “make the most of 
the cases it does hear by issuing broad (maximal) decisions that guide the lower courts in the many cases 
that it lacks the capacity to review”). 
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presumption in favor of explanatory opinions, even relatively short ones, should 
appropriately discipline the Court to give more serious attention to the statutes 
that vest mandatory appeals with the Court, instead of treating them the same as 
petitions for certiorari but with differing precedential effects for a refusal to hear 
a case.153 The Court should limit its one-line orders to those cases, like denials of 
certiorari, where it truly intends to leave the lower court’s opinion intact without 
any explanation or precedent. 
III. PRECEDENT THAT BINDS THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS 
A related question of precedent vexes three-judge district courts themselves: to 
what extent must they follow prior cases of the circuit court in which they sit? On 
the one hand, these courts are formally “district” courts, suggesting that they 
should follow the caselaw of the circuit, like all single district judges in that cir-
cuit. This appears to be the majority view among these courts.154 
On the other hand, an appeal from a decision of these courts goes directly to 
the Supreme Court, skipping the circuit court of appeals altogether.155 If a court is 
bound only by the decisions of the courts that review them, then the only prece-
dent that should bind three-judge district courts are decisions of the Supreme 
Court. Even though three-judge district courts are called “district” courts, they 
are not inferior to the circuit courts in all circumstances. Three-judge district 
courts are specialized creatures that are not formally “below” the circuit courts 
but instead generally operate outside of them. Moreover, Congress created these 
courts to have greater independence to promote their legitimacy. Under this view, 
circuit precedent should not bind them.156 
A. CURRENT VIEWS ON WHETHER CIRCUIT PRECEDENT SHOULD BIND THREE-JUDGE 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Three-judge district courts have struggled with whether they must follow cir-
cuit precedent. Some judges have determined that, because they are technically 
sitting on “district” courts, and because district courts are below the circuit courts 
of appeal, then circuit precedent must bind them. But other judges sitting on 
three-judge district courts take the opposite view: circuit precedent is persuasive, 
but not binding, given that circuit courts cannot review their decisions, as an 
appeal skips the court of appeals and goes directly to the Supreme Court. Few 
judges, however, have considered explicitly the rationale behind either approach. 
153. Several commentators have characterized the Court’s conflation of denials of certiorari with 
summary affirmances of mandatory appeals as “lawless” because it is arguably inconsistent with the 
direct appeal statutes and is done, it appears, mainly for the Court’s own convenience. See, e.g., Edward 
A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1708–10 (2000). 
154. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
155. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012). 
156. As we discuss below, under this model three-judge district courts still could find circuit 
precedent highly persuasive, even if not binding. 
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The analysis from a three-judge district court that reviewed Ohio’s post-2000 
redistricting plan exemplifies this problem. In Parker v. Ohio, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the redistricting plan for the state legislature diluted the votes of 
African-Americans, in violation of the Voting Rights Act.157 Because the claim 
challenged a statewide redistricting, it went before a three-judge district court. 
The plaintiffs sought the creation of “influence districts” as a remedy to give 
African-Americans greater voting power.158 In an influence district, even though 
minorities “cannot form a majority, . . . they are sufficiently large and cohesive to 
effectively influence elections, getting their candidate of choice elected.”159 In a 
prior case, Cousin v. Sundquist, the Sixth Circuit held that the Voting Rights Act 
did not support a claim for influence districts.160 Cousin did not go before a three- 
judge district court because the claim in that case was about the method of 
electing judges in a county in Tennessee161—not a congressional or statewide leg-
islative redistricting claim that would fall under the Three-Judge Court Act. Yet 
the substantive nature of the issue was the same: may plaintiffs secure the crea-
tion of influence districts under the Voting Rights Act? 
The three-judge district court in Parker determined that it was required to 
follow the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Cousin that the VRA did not support this 
argument: “While plaintiffs are correct that the . . . Supreme Court [has] not 
yet ruled on influence districts, we are bound by precedent in this circuit.”162 In 
other words, the Parker court found that, because of Cousin, “influence claims 
are not cognizable in our circuit.”163 Yet the court provided no reasoning for its 
conclusion that it must follow Sixth Circuit precedent. The majority opinion 
simply stated, without explanation, “we are bound by precedent in this cir-
cuit,”164 and the concurrence said, again without any animating logic, “a ma-
jority of three-judge district courts and circuit courts of appeals hold that 
circuit court precedent is binding on a three-judge district court.”165 It is 
unclear how the court would have ruled on the issue had it exercised its own, 
independent judgment, though one concurring judge said he would have 
rejected the claim even without the precedent he found binding166 and the other 
judge, concurring for a different reason, stated that he would recognize a claim 
for influence districts.167   
157. 263 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1102–03 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (three-judge court). 
158. Id. at 1104. 
159. Id. 
160. 145 F.3d 818, 828 (6th Cir. 1998). 
161. Id. at 820. 
162. Parker, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 1108 (Graham, J., concurring). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 1113 (Gwin, J., concurring). 
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Most three-judge district courts have agreed with the Parker court, finding that 
circuit precedent binds them.168 One three-judge district court provided some 
logic for this rule: “The addition by Congress in the three-judge court acts of a 
second district judge and a Circuit Judge together with direct appeal to the 
Supreme Court was not a grant of authority with elevated precedential stature but 
a withdrawal of power from a single judge.”169 According to this view, a three- 
judge district court is simply that—a district court—that sits within the circuit. 
The court itself is called the “District Court of” the particular state in the cir-
cuit.170 It is not constituted as a geography-free federal tribunal. 
Failing to adhere to circuit precedent could create a practical problem: the crea-
tion of “intra-circuit conflict with no meaningful mechanism for its resolution 
within the Circuit,” meaning that only the Supreme Court could resolve that con-
flict.171 That is, if a three-judge district court rules contrary to the prior decisions 
of a previous three-judge district court or the circuit itself, then the circuit court— 
either through a normal appellate panel or en banc review—has no mechanism to 
reconcile the conflicting rules. This intra-circuit conflict could lead to confusion 
and additional litigation, forcing the Supreme Court to step in and resolve the 
discrepancy. 
Yet the alternative view, that circuit precedent does not formally bind the 
three-judge district court, is quite persuasive, at least from the perspective of tra-
ditional judicial decisionmaking. As Judge Gwin, who wrote separately in 
Parker, explained: 
The doctrine of stare decisis in practice, commands that lower courts follow 
the precedent of courts who review their decisions. If our decision is review-
able only by the Supreme Court, logic suggests that we are not bound by cir-
cuit authority. While such authority may persuade, only Supreme Court  
168. See, e.g., Ga. State Conference of NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1278 (N.D. Ga. 
2017) (three-judge court) (stating that “we are bound by Eleventh Circuit precedent); Perez v. Abbott, 
250 F. Supp. 3d 123, 138–39 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (three-judge court) (stating that the court must “follow 
[binding circuit precedent] in the absence of any authority to the contrary”); Ala. Legislative Black 
Caucus v. Alabama, 988 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1305 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (three-judge court) (stating that the 
court “is bound by Eleventh Circuit precedent”); NAACP v. Snyder, 879 F. Supp. 2d 662, 672 (E.D. 
Mich. 2012) (three-judge court) (stating that Sixth Circuit precedent “is binding precedent that controls 
our decision today”). For a lengthier list of cases taking this position, see Baksalary v. Smith, 579 F. 
Supp. 218, 226–27 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (three-judge court). 
169. Russell v. Hathaway, 423 F. Supp. 833, 835 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (three-judge court). 
170. See Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Corp. of Neb., 58 F. Supp. 523, 542 (D. Neb. 1944) 
(“However constituted, the [three-judge district] court . . . was only the District Court for the Federal 
Judicial District of Nebraska.”). A practical analysis would emphasize how the circuit is intertwined 
with the creation and life of the three-judge district court. One could imagine convening the court and 
selecting the three judges in other ways, such as by lottery, or by the Chief Justice of the United States. 
But Congress designated the head of the circuit to do it, and the statute seems to contemplate, though 
does not explicitly require, that all of the appointed judges be from that circuit. Likewise, one could 
imagine a geography-free court (such as the U.S. Tax Court), but Congress declined to pursue this 
option as well. All proceedings of the court take place, literally, in one circuit. 
171. Russell, 423 F. Supp. at 835. 
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holdings would seem to have controlling authority.172 
Similarly, a three-judge district court in Washington State explicitly stated, “[i]n 
this special three-judge court case we are not bound by any judicial decisions 
other than those of the United States Supreme Court.”173 Other courts have at 
least considered it an open question as to whether they must follow circuit prece-
dent or whether only Supreme Court caselaw can bind them.174 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF DETERMINING WHICH PRECEDENT APPLIES 
At the outset, the question of whether three-judge district courts must follow 
circuit precedent as binding law might seem trivial. Whether circuit law is bind-
ing precedent or merely persuasive may not make a difference in most cases, as 
the three-judge district court is likely to follow a well-reasoned circuit court deci-
sion regardless of whether it is formally binding precedent or not. In the grand 
scheme of things, what is the big deal? 
There are three primary reasons for three-judge district courts to consider care-
fully whether they must follow circuit precedent: (1) the formal aspects of proper 
judicial decisionmaking, (2) adherence to congressional intent in achieving 
greater independence and legitimacy, and (3) the desire to reach correct out-
comes, especially in politically charged cases. 
First, it is improper as a matter of judicial hierarchy for a case to bind a subse-
quent court when the court issuing that purported precedent cannot review the 
subsequent court’s decisions. “Binding precedent” has a specific meaning: a 
“lower” court must follow the decisions of a “higher” court in the judicial hierar-
chy.175 This is a consideration grounded in formalism, or the notion that judicial 
decisionmaking must adhere to formal legal rules.176 A circuit court cannot 
review the decision of a three-judge district court, so a three-judge district court 
172. Parker, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 n.3 (Gwin, J., concurring). 
173. Jehovah’s Witnesses in Wash. v. King Cty. Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 504–05 (W.D. Wash. 
1967) (three-judge court), aff’d, 390 U.S. 598 (1968). 
174. See, e.g., Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 988 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1342 n.13 (M.D. 
Ala. 2013) (three-judge court) (Thompson, J., concurring and dissenting); Confederated Tribes of 
Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339, 1356 n.16 (E.D. Wash. 1978) (three- 
judge court); Poe v. Werner, 386 F. Supp. 1014, 1016–17 & n.4 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (noting “a difference of 
opinion among the federal courts on this question”); see also Ga. State Conference of NAACP v. 
Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (Duffey, J., concurring) (asserting that the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses decision, 278 F. Supp. at 504–05, is the only one where a court “concluded it was 
not bound by its circuit’s precedent”). After we posted a draft of this article online, another three-judge 
district court—citing our draft—noted that “[t]here is some question as to whether the precedent of the 
circuit in which a three-judge district court sits is binding on that court.” Lavergne v. U.S. House of 
Representatives, No. 17-793, 2018 WL 4286404, at *8 n.3 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2018) (three-judge court), 
appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 2018 WL 4257881 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2018) (No. 18-290). The court 
declined to “weigh in on this debate” but said that even if D.C. Circuit precedent was not binding, it was 
“highly persuasive.” Id. 
175. See Caminker, supra note 21, at 818. 
176. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (footnotes omitted) (“At 
the heart of the word ‘formalism,’ in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept of decisionmaking 
according to rule.”). 
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need not, as a matter of formal judicial decisionmaking, adhere to circuit prece-
dent. Of course, a three-judge district court can follow circuit precedent as per-
suasive if it wants; the proper understanding of a judge’s role in a hierarchical 
system, however, does not require it to do so.177 
Three-judge district courts themselves express confusion over whether they 
must follow circuit precedent as a matter of proper judicial decisionmaking. As a 
three-judge district court in Georgia recently explained, 
[S]ome say the traditional rationale for stare decisis—following the precedent 
of courts that review the lower court’s decisions—does not make sense for 
three-judge district courts like ours. . . . Nevertheless, this panel elects to fol-
low Eleventh Circuit precedent. 
At the same time, we realize that what we decide here cannot be reviewed 
by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc, even if the en banc court were to dis-
agree with us. And our lack of guidance extends beyond the en banc court, 
because the Supreme Court routinely issues summary affirmances of three- 
judge district courts in voting cases. Those summary opinions often tell us 
nothing more than that a judgment was correct “but not necessarily the reason-
ing.” Thus, in this area of voting rights, we are left to fill in gaps where we 
have little or incomplete guidance from the courts that may ultimately resolve 
these issues.178 
One of the judges, in a concurring opinion, lamented that “[i]t seems the ration-
ale for following circuit precedent is because courts have found that some law is 
better than no law.”179 Noting that the question was “unclear,” the judge “reluc-
tantly” agreed to follow circuit precedent because doing so in that case “pro-
motes, albeit to an uncertain degree, uniformity of the law at least within a 
circuit.”180 
As this recent Georgia case demonstrates, some judges on three-judge district 
courts find the notion odd, if not improper, that they must follow circuit law when 
the circuit court cannot overrule them. A proper application of judicial hierarchy 
in this instance would resolve the confusion. 
Second, Congress presumed that having three judges at the outset of a case 
would better protect important rights such as the right to vote.181 Independence in 
these important political cases is thus a significant virtue underlying the very exis-
tence of three-judge district courts. Congress created the three-judge district court 
177. As discussed below, as a matter of court rule, circuit court precedent can bind a subsequent 
circuit court panel, even though one panel cannot review the decisions of another panel. Yet the same 
court, sitting en banc, can reverse a panel decision. More poignantly, the prior-panel rule rests on strong 
institutional reasons, such as the need for uniformity within a circuit, that are less relevant in the three- 
judge district court context. See infra notes  211–17 and accompanying text. 
178. Ga. State Conference of NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1278–79 n.7 (quoting Mandel v. Bradley, 
432 U.S. 173 (1977) (per curiam)). 
179. Id. at 1286 (Duffey, J., concurring). 
180. Id. at 1286–87. 
181. See supra note 45 (discussing the legislative history). 
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specifically to allow multiple minds to resolve highly charged issues at the case’s 
inception.182 Although it is not clear why Congress kept the three-judge district 
court for redistricting and campaign finance cases while abolishing it in most 
other instances in 1976, it seems that an animating rationale was that three judges 
at the outset are superior for cases involving the political process.183 Having three 
judges can lead to greater deliberation and reduce the likelihood that pure parti-
sanship will drive the decisions at the trial court level.184 
A rule that three-judge district courts must follow circuit precedent, however, 
may harm the unique status, and thus legitimacy, that Congress sought in their 
creation. Three-judge district courts would be without the authority to determine 
independently whether the circuit rule in a similar case is wise or even correct; a 
mandatory rule would obligate them to follow the circuit precedent blindly— 
even precedent that they find simply wrong but that the en banc court has not yet 
overturned. In this way, a rule that three-judge district courts must invariably fol-
low circuit precedent would unnecessarily tie the hands of the three-judge district 
court. Congress, in creating this unique species of the judiciary to resolve certain 
182. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 757 (1982) (“Assuming 
that all panel members take seriously their responsibility for independent exercise of judgment, the give 
and take of discussion may produce a result better than any single mind could reach.”). 
183. See Solimine, supra note 33, at 142 (“The legislative record is unclear regarding the motivation 
for the amendment [abolishing three-judge district courts in general but retaining them for redistricting 
cases], but such luminaries as Judges Henry Friendly and J. Skelly Wright enthusiastically endorsed it in 
their testimony. They pointed out the various burdens associated with convening such courts and argued 
that the purported need for the court had come and gone. On the other hand, they suggested that it was 
appropriate to convene such courts for redistricting cases in order to facilitate issues of ‘public 
importance’ and, in their view, the ‘public acceptance’ of decisions. Moreover, they stated that the 
evidence in such cases was likely to be heavily statistical in nature, and that no additional taking of other 
evidence would typically be necessary.” (citing Admiralty Jurisdiction, United States As a Party, 
General Federal Question Jurisdiction, Three-Judge Courts: Hearing on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. 
on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 748–50, 757–61, 783– 
92 (1972) (statements of Judge Friendly and Judge Wright)). 
184. See Douglas, supra note 16, at 462–63. The record is unclear as to both why Congress left the 
three-judge district court intact in 1976 for reapportionment cases and whether and to what extent 
members of Congress perceived that judges in such cases voted in ideologically predictable ways. For a 
contemporaneous account addressing this point by the Deputy Counsel to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, see Michael J. Mullen, Improving Judicial Administration by Repealing the Requirements 
for Three-Judge District Courts, 20 CATH. LAW. 372, 376 (1974) (“The judgment was that there is a 
great deal of leeway given to a court in a reapportionment case, and the appearance of fairness and 
fairness in fact must be assured. A decision by a single judge—a Republican judge or a Democratic 
judge—that might be questioned as politically motivated should be avoided.”). That said, we are not 
arguing that in 1976—or today—federal judges serving on three-judge district courts were 
systematically less ideological than their peers who decided similar cases (such as those concerning 
elections) sitting alone. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the 
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493 (2008) (finding that ideology 
has a “sizable and robust effect on the likelihood of a judge” assigning liability in VRA section 2 cases); 
Mark Jonathan McKenzie, The Influence of Partisanship, Ideology, and the Law on Redistricting 
Decisions in the Federal Courts, 65 POL. RES. Q. 799 (2012) (finding that judges in redistricting cases 
can be described as constrained partisans). Our point is that it is reasonable to infer that Congress 
retained the three-judge district court for reapportionment cases, at least in part, on the presumption that 
ideological and political considerations by judges in these settings would be ameliorated, or at least 
balanced, with multiple members. 
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issues, believed that it would be better for three judicial minds to grapple with 
potentially difficult and controversial topics at the trial court level.185 That special 
process within the federal court system provides the legitimacy that undergirds 
these courts’ creation. Although all lower courts must follow precedent, unneces-
sarily binding three-judge district courts would take away an aspect of their 
independence. 
Finally, forcing a three-judge district court to follow circuit precedent might 
lead this court to come to a contrary conclusion than if it had reviewed the matter 
anew, producing results that could undermine the democratic process. One aspect 
of the independence and legitimacy that three-judge district courts enjoy is the 
increased likelihood that their collective wisdom might help them reach the “cor-
rect” decision and that a single judge’s ideology will not rule the day. The hope 
for greater accuracy is a virtue of three-judge district courts.186 If the three-judge 
district court finds that circuit precedent is wrong, however, there is no way for 
the court to avoid that decision under a rule directing it to follow circuit precedent 
as binding. Of course, three-judge panels of a circuit court of appeals also have 
multiple members, possibly tempering ideological and incorrect decisions, so one 
might think that it is inconsequential to have those decisions bind subsequent 
three-judge district courts. But Congress designated certain cases involving the 
political process for three judges at the trial level to give these courts greater legit-
imacy; tying their hands might take away from that goal. 
Under a regime that requires three-judge district courts to follow circuit prece-
dent they find misguided, the judges would have to highlight the problem and 
hope that the Supreme Court will correct the error on direct review. Yet the Court 
often summarily affirms these courts’ decisions.187 That fact means that the Court 
could affirm the three-judge district court’s decision, albeit on a different ground, 
without passing upon the circuit precedent on which the three-judge district court 
relied. This course of events could, in turn, cause the Court itself to perpetuate a 
circuit split on an issue. Suppose that two different circuits have ruled differently 
on a legal issue involving a local redistricting, but the Supreme Court has not yet 
resolved the conflict. Three-judge district courts encountering the same legal 
issue in a statewide redistricting case in those circuits would have to follow each 
circuit’s law. That is, the three-judge district courts would be required to perpetu-
ate that circuit split. And because these cases receive direct appeal to the 
Supreme Court, the Court could summarily affirm both cases without explana-
tion, with the perverse effect of the Court inadvertently sustaining a circuit split. 
It would be unclear whether the Court, in summarily affirming the cases, was also 
affirming the three-judge district court’s reliance on circuit precedent. Allowing a 
three-judge district court to consider the issue independently could mitigate this 
185. Douglas, supra note 16, at 462–63. 
186. See id.; cf. Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court 
Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899, 924 (1989) (“Assigning 
several judges to a problem reduces the risk that important lines of analysis will escape attention.”). 
187. See supra Section II.B. 
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problem by permitting three-judge district courts to resolve cases as they see fit, 
avoiding the potential of an incorrect decision (as deemed later by the Supreme 
Court) simply because the lower court could not question circuit precedent. 
In fact, the Supreme Court has inadvertently perpetuated an implicit circuit 
split on whether circuit precedent is binding by affirming three-judge district 
courts that have both followed and not followed circuit precedent. Does this 
mean that circuit precedent both binds and does not bind a three-judge district 
court? For example, the Court has summarily affirmed three-judge district courts 
that followed circuit precedent,188 but it also summarily affirmed a decision in 
which the three-judge district court explicitly stated that circuit precedent did not 
bind it.189 By summarily affirming in both instances, the Court at least signaled 
that both approaches are correct, though without a written opinion it is difficult to 
know for sure. Three-judge district courts, as well as the litigants before them, are 
left lost at sea on this important question, which could dictate the outcome of 
cases involving the core aspects of our democracy. 
In sum, although there is certainly a formalistic aspect to our proposal, in that 
courts generally should not feel bound by other courts that cannot review them, 
prudential and institutional considerations are also significant. At its core, tying 
the hands of three-judge district courts may increase the likelihood that these 
courts will reach decisions that fail to consider the substantive issues independ-
ently. This process could lead to results that the Supreme Court ultimately may 
find to be incorrect, yet the decision will affect upcoming elections in the mean-
time. In addition, the Supreme Court has obliquely affirmed both approaches— 
approving of decisions both where three-judge district courts have followed and 
not followed circuit precedent—creating doctrinal confusion in the process. 
Perhaps most importantly, Congress wanted three-judge district courts, to a 
degree, to exhibit independence and achieve more “legitimate” decisions for cer-
tain important cases by having multiple judges hear them from the outset. 
Unnecessarily binding these courts to circuit precedent runs contrary to that goal. 
C. THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS AND THE HIERARCHY OF FEDERAL COURTS 
To determine whether three-judge district courts must follow circuit caselaw, 
we must assess the relationship between trial and appellate courts in light of the 
goals behind the Three-Judge Court Act. As Professor Evan Caminker explains, 
in a system founded upon hierarchical precedent, “longstanding doctrine dictates 
that a court is always bound to follow a precedent established by a court ‘supe-
rior’ to it.”190 The word “superior” connotes that the higher court has some 
188. See, e.g., Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004), aff’g 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1352 n.16 (N.D. Ga.) 
(per curiam) (three-judge court). 
189. Jehovah’s Witnesses in Wash. v. King Cty. Hosp., 390 U.S. 598 (1968), aff’g 278 F. Supp. 488, 
504–05 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (per curiam) (three-judge court). 
190. Caminker, supra note 21, at 818; see also Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The 
Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12 (1994) (“It is 
axiomatic that an inferior court must respect prior precedents created by its superior courts . . . .”); see 
also id. at 3 (“[A]n inferior court must follow precedent established by a court that is superior to it.”). 
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supervisory power over the lower court, such that the lower court must conform 
its decision to the superior court’s precedent. As Professor Caminker explains: 
The duty to obey hierarchical precedent tracks the path of review followed 
by a particular case as it moves up the three federal judicial tiers: A court must 
follow the precedents established by the court(s) directly above it. District 
courts must follow both Supreme Court decisions and those issued by which-
ever court of appeals has revisory jurisdiction over its decisions, and courts of 
appeals must heed Supreme Court decisions. However, a court can ignore 
precedents established by other courts so long as they lack revisory jurisdiction 
over it. Thus, a circuit court of appeals is not bound by decisions of coordinate 
circuit courts of appeals, and a district court judge may ignore the decisions of 
“foreign” courts of appeals as well as other district court judges, even within 
the same district.191 
Despite the universal acceptance of this system of judicial hierarchy, Professor 
Caminker persuasively argues that the doctrine, broadly applied, is not required 
as a matter of constitutional law.192 Article III, creating one Supreme Court, 
strongly implies that all federal courts must follow Supreme Court precedent.193 
But the Constitution is less clear on whether and when lower federal courts must 
follow other lower federal courts. Article III, he points out, is opaque on hierarchy 
as such; it does not mandate the creation of the lower federal courts, and it sug-
gests that Congress has considerable authority to regulate and limit the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court and of the lower courts it does create.194 The doctrine, 
Caminker continues, is better thought of as primarily resting on a set of conse-
quentialist and institutional (prudential) concerns, including judicial economy, 
deference to the presumably more proficient reasoning of multimember appellate 
courts accustomed to law development, and the need for uniform interpretation 
of the law.195 Despite these somewhat shaky jurisprudential foundations, 
Caminker acknowledges that the “overwhelming consensus” of both judges and 
academics supports the “precedent model,” under which “lower courts ought to 
define the law merely by interpreting existing precedents, without considering 
what their higher courts would likely do on appeal.”196 
Assuming the validity of the rule—that “higher” courts bind lower court judges 
in the judicial hierarchy—then the converse will usually be true as well: absent a 
particular justification, judges need not follow decisions of courts that are not 
191. Caminker, supra note 21, at 824–25 (footnotes omitted). 
192. Id. at 828–38. 
193. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Caminker, supra note 21, at 834. 
194. Caminker, supra note  21, at 828–38. 
195. Id. at 839–56. 
196. Caminker, supra note 190, at 5–6; see also Grove, supra note 152, at 31–32 (discussing and 
summarizing literature on the constitutional significance of hierarchal precedent); Pauline T. Kim, 
Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 409–10 (2007) (highlighting the difference between a 
lower court’s duty to adhere to formal precedent and a lower court’s discretion not to follow a superior 
court’s preferences). 
446 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:413 
directly above them. Indeed, this is the reason for why one district court need not 
follow the ruling of a prior district court and why one circuit court is not required 
to rule consistently with another circuit court.197 
This brings us to the ultimate question: is a three-judge district court inferior to 
a circuit court? From a formal hierarchical standpoint, the answer is no. In the 
federal court hierarchy, the only court that sits “above” the three-judge district 
court is the Supreme Court. Only the Supreme Court can hear an appeal from and 
affirm or reverse the three-judge district court’s ruling.198 The circuit court plays 
no role in the three-judge district court’s operation beyond having the Chief 
Judge of the circuit appoint two of the judges and having at least one circuit judge 
serve on the panel.199 Congress, the creator of three-judge district courts, gave the 
circuit court no other function with respect to these special tribunals. Once the 
ministerial responsibilities of convening the court are over, the circuit court plays 
no further role in the operation of the three-judge district court.200 If a court must 
197. Caminker, supra note  21, at 824–25. 
198. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012). 
199. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1) (2012). 
200. Illustrating the odd nature of the three-judge district court, there are exceptions to what the court 
must decide. Once the three-judge district court has ruled on the merits of the claim, there may be 
collateral issues remaining, such as an award of attorneys’ fees. Because the language of the convening 
statute arguably does not cover those topics, courts have typically held that the court’s disposition of 
those issues is appealable in the first instance to the circuit court, not the Supreme Court. See, e.g., 
League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Johnson, 902 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 2018) (appeal from three-judge 
district court of denial of motion to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24); Brat v. 
Personhuballah, 883 F.3d 475 (4th Cir. 2018) (appeal of award of attorneys’ fees by three-judge district 
court); see also 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4040, at 114– 
15 (2007). 
Another exception is when the district judge, to whom the case is originally assigned, decides that a 
three-judge district court should not be convened because the case does not satisfy the terms of the 
statute. The Supreme Court has never been clear on whether the appeal of such a decision should be 
directly to it, or first to the circuit court. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra, at 94–100 (noting that the Supreme 
Court or the court of appeals can order the lower court to convene a three-judge district court). Most 
courts allow an appeal to the circuit court and treat the case under its normal appellate procedure. For a 
recent example, see Benisek v. Mack, 584 F. App’x 140 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Shapiro v. 
McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015). 
Shapiro itself might be said to be less than clear on this point. In that case, the Court held that a 
district judge is required to convene a three-judge district court unless the claim is “insubstantial.” 136 
S. Ct. at 455. That language might suggest that circuit precedent would govern that issue, because an 
appeal of a dismissal on such grounds would go to the circuit, and presumably circuit precedent would 
govern that appeal. For two reasons, however, this interpretation misreads Shapiro. For one, the 
Supreme Court has long remained unclear on whether an appeal of such a decision by a single district 
judge must go to the circuit, or on direct appeal to the Court, or perhaps even be subject to writ of 
mandamus by the Court. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra, at 94–95 n.16 (discussing cases which allow for all 
three possibilities). For another, the discussion on insubstantiality in Shapiro is concerned with the 
jurisdiction of any federal court; if the claim is indeed insubstantial, then no federal court can hear the 
case. In contrast, Shapiro says that if the claim is not insubstantial—that is, so long as there is federal 
jurisdiction—then only a three-judge district court can dismiss it on the merits. 136 S. Ct. at 455–56. We 
do not read Shapiro as undermining our arguments: once there is federal jurisdiction, only a three-judge 
district court can render substantive rulings in the case, and those rulings are appealable only to the 
Supreme Court. We thank Michael Morley for his helpful comments on this point. 
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follow only the precedent of a court “superior” to it, then only Supreme Court 
precedent binds a three-judge district court. 
D. PRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETERMINING THE PRECEDENTIAL WEIGHT OF 
CIRCUIT LAW ON THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS 
If the conclusion that circuit precedent should not bind three-judge district 
courts is so obvious, then why is it a distinctly minority position among the courts 
that have addressed the issue? We can think of several explanations: (1) a desire 
to achieve uniformity, (2) the perceived benefits from the percolation of issues, 
and (3) efficiency.201 Yet, upon further reflection, none of these justifications are 
convincing. Further, other exceptions to when one court must follow the law of 
another court even when the first court cannot overrule the second—such as the 
circuit court prior-panel rule—are inapplicable in this setting. 
First, consider uniformity, or the desire to have district courts within a circuit 
rule in the same way. The only method to ensure this occurs is to require all dis-
trict courts, including three-judge district courts, to follow circuit precedent. If a 
three-judge district court is not obliged to follow circuit precedent, then similarly 
(though not identically) situated litigants living in the same state (never mind the 
same circuit) arguably could have their rights litigated under different legal 
regimes. Recall the decision in Parker v. Ohio, the case in which a three-judge 
district court invoked Sixth Circuit precedent to reject the plaintiffs’ request for 
the creation of “influence districts” to avoid the dilution of African-American 
voting strength.202 Refusing to follow circuit precedent would have meant that 
the three-judge district court within the Sixth Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit itself, 
would have diverged on how to interpret this kind of claim under the Voting 
Rights Act. 
But there are probably few cases in which a three-judge district court will find 
circuit precedent wrong. Those cases, however, involve the structure and func-
tioning of our democracy, so although few in number, they are large in impor-
tance. By leaving the three-judge district court intact for reapportionment cases 
in 1976, Congress in effect designated those courts as specialized tribunals that 
could give greater attention to these particularly important cases.203 Requiring 
201. In addition to the reasons we discuss in the text, there might be the more prosaic explanation of 
path dependence: most judges and lawyers may be comfortable with the majority rule and see no reason 
to argue to the contrary, to the extent they consider the issue at all. Thus, it is very common for three- 
judge district courts to cite and follow circuit precedent without even mentioning whether they believe 
circuit precedent binds them. See, e.g., Corman v. Torres, 287 F. Supp. 3d 558 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (three- 
judge court). 
202. 263 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1105 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (three-judge court) (relying on Cousin v. 
Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 828 (6th Cir. 1998)). 
203. It is unclear why Congress left this exception in place when it abolished the rest of the 
jurisdiction of three-judge district courts. From the relatively scant legislative history on point, Congress 
apparently concluded that the perceived virtues of three-judge district courts, including multimember 
decisionmaking, arguably greater legitimacy, and prompt review when necessary by the Supreme Court, 
remained important for possibly high-profile and controversial reapportionment cases. See generally 
Douglas, supra note 16, at 462–63 (discussing the virtues and weaknesses of three-judge district courts); 
Mullen, supra note 184, at 376 (discussing some of the perceived problems of three-judge district courts 
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uniformity with circuit case law would hamper the ability of three-judge district 
courts to decide these significant issues independently. A desire for uniformity 
should not outweigh the primary goal behind Congress’s creation of three-judge 
district courts. 
Encouraging percolation of issues might supply another reason to support a re-
gime in which circuit precedent is binding on three-judge district courts. Often 
the Supreme Court will not grant certiorari in a case unless there is a circuit split 
and lower courts have considered various aspects of the issue. In this way, the 
issue can “percolate” among lower courts, which helps to inform the Supreme 
Court’s analysis.204 But if three-judge district courts are free agents unbound by 
circuit precedent, then possibly novel legal issues will be decided at the trial 
level, with a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court is then obliged to 
decide the case on the merits, unaided by the usual percolation of issues in 
circuit courts.205 Although it is not clear whether the Supreme Court’s decisions 
are “better” after percolation of an issue, there is at least some evidence that lower 
court percolation aids the Court’s review.206 
But this concern overlooks the fact that percolation can occur among three- 
judge district courts for the topics that Congress deemed important enough 
for these specialized tribunals, including inherently political issues involving 
redistricting and campaign finance. Requiring three-judge district courts to follow 
circuit precedent would take away their ability to consider arguments independ-
ently, precluding the issues from percolating within the three-judge district courts 
that are actively reviewing them. Consider, for instance, the issue of whether and 
to what extent political gerrymandering claims are justiciable in federal court 
and, if so, the appropriate judicial standard to use. When the Supreme Court con-
fronted that issue in Vieth v. Jubelirer,207 the Court drew on the experience of var-
ious three-judge district courts, citing several that had rejected claims of partisan 
gerrymandering under the then-prevalent standard to show that the standard was 
unworkable.208 The most recent round of litigation on this point during the 2017 
but noting they may be helpful to achieve actual or perceived fairness in reapportionment cases, which 
necessarily involve politics); Solimine, supra note 33, at 144–45 (discussing the perceived “importance” 
of three-judge district court cases and the three-judge district court’s supposed ability to neutralize the 
effects of individual judges’ partisanship). We acknowledge that the text and legislative history of the 
1976 amendment does not directly address the precise issue discussed in this Part of the Article. But for 
the reasons discussed in the text, we think a reasonable inference from Congress’s decision to leave the 
three-judge district court, and its direct appeal provision, intact for reapportionment cases supports the 
notion that circuit precedent does not formally bind those courts. 
204. See Solimine, supra note 33, at 142–45 (discussing the impact of direct appeals from three- 
judge district courts on percolation). 
205. Id.; cf. Nicholas O. Stephanopolous, The Relegation of Polarization, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 
160, 165 (2017) (arguing that “doctrinal confusion” has arisen in the development of reapportionment 
law in lower courts regarding section 2 of the Voting Rights Act given direct appeals and lack of 
intermediate appellate review). 
206. See Solimine, supra note 31, at 146–47 (highlighting studies that suggest some benefits based 
on percolation in helping the Court decide which cases to take and in ultimately resolving a dispute). 
207. 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
208. Id. at 279–81, 279–81 & n.6. 
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Term in Gill v. Whitford209 also stemmed from disparate resolutions of partisan 
gerrymandering claims among several three-judge district courts.210 Thus, perco-
lation still can occur for these issues where it is most appropriate: among three- 
judge district courts themselves. 
Finally, perhaps it is more efficient to follow the law with which the members 
of any three-judge district court are most familiar and consider controlling prece-
dent, namely, the law of that circuit, especially given the presumed superiority of 
circuit court decisionmaking. Circuit law is potentially better reasoned because 
three judges, instead of one, sit on the panel to decide a case, allowing multiple 
minds to shape a decision. Yet the purported superiority of resolving difficult 
legal issues by multimember appellate courts is irrelevant here given that three- 
judge district courts are, by definition, multimember tribunals. They already ben-
efit from the considered judgment of three federal judges regardless of whether 
they must follow circuit precedent or not. In addition, although it may be more ef-
ficient for three-judge district courts to have caselaw they must follow—because 
being forced to adhere to binding precedent might make the decisionmaking pro-
cess easier and faster—that efficiency would come with a significant trade-off in 
independence and legitimacy. There is nothing to suggest that Congress wanted 
three-judge district courts to give up all of their independence in favor of effi-
ciency. The specialized court itself already benefits from a faster resolution pro-
cess by skipping the court of appeals stage, so there is no reason to favor 
efficiency over all other goals, including the desire to allow three judicial minds 
to come to their own decision on an important issue. 
Separate from these prudential considerations, perhaps three-judge district 
courts must follow circuit precedent, even though circuit courts cannot review 
their decisions, as a corollary to the courts of appeals’ prior-panel rule, a promi-
nent exception to the notion that only higher court caselaw is binding.211 Under 
the prior-panel rule, a decision of a three-judge panel in a circuit court binds all 
future three-judge panels in that circuit; only the court sitting en banc (or the 
Supreme Court) may overrule a three-judge appellate panel’s decision.212 The 
209. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
210. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 890 & n.176 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (citing Radogno v. Ill. 
State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:11-cv-04884, 2011 WL 5025251, at *4–6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2011) 
(referring to other three-judge district court decisions from different circuits, handed down since Vieth, 
addressing political gerrymandering claims)), vacated on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
211. There are other instances in which federal courts consider themselves bound by precedent 
generated by non-reviewing courts, such as following state law in diversity cases, or relatedly asking 
state courts certified questions of state law. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF 
FEDERAL COURTS 333–35, 390–97 (7th ed. 2011). 
212. See, e.g., Cooper & Berman, supra note 138, at 721 n.91 (“Panels in each circuit have 
consistently stated that they lack the authority to overrule decisions by prior panels; thus, as a general 
matter, a panel’s decision binds subsequent panels absent an intervening decision of the Supreme Court, 
act of Congress, or en banc decision by the court as a whole.”); Martha Dragich, Uniformity, Inferiority, 
and the Law of the Circuit Doctrine, 56 LOY. L. REV. 535, 538 (2010); Phillip M. Kannan, The 
Precedential Force of Panel Law, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 755, 755–56 (1993) (noting that under the prior- 
panel rule, “[n]o panel can overrule the precedent established by any panel in the same circuit; all panels 
are bound by prior panel decisions in the same circuit”); Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior 
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rule appears to rest on an assumption by the circuit courts that, because the en 
banc court is authorized to overrule prior precedent, individual panels are not.213 
Permitting only en banc courts to overrule circuit precedent may improve judicial 
administration because it reduces the number of intra-circuit conflicts and thereby 
provides greater certainty for district courts.214 Thus, although not theorized 
deeply, the prior-panel rule seems to rest on concerns of uniformity and 
finality.215 
But, for several reasons, the justifications underlying the prior-panel rule do 
not apply to three-judge district courts and do not justify application of a similar 
rule in this context. Uniformity and finality are not as pressing for three-judge dis-
trict courts, at least as compared to other virtues such as impartiality and legiti-
macy, given the specific subject matters at issue. The whole point of having 
certain cases, which mostly involve politics at a broad level, go to three judges at 
the outset is to avoid the reality or perception of ideology affecting the decision at 
the trial level, as well as to increase the likelihood of reaching the “correct” result 
early in the process.216 If a three-judge district court must follow a prior appellate 
panel’s decision, then that forced adherence might take away the perceived inde-
pendence and corresponding greater legitimacy of the three-judge district court’s 
decision. Because these cases are often viewed as inherently political, the three- 
judge district court should be unshackled from a prior decision that does not for-
mally bind it. Three-judge district courts should have the independence to rule in 
the way they deem “correct,” using the prior circuit law as highly persuasive but 
not formally binding. This is the best way to promote the ideals of unbiased and 
legitimate decisionmaking, which are particularly important virtues of the three- 
judge district court. 
To be sure, the reverse is also possible: making three-judge district courts free 
agents could potentially increase ideologically-based decisionmaking, especially 
if prior circuit precedent, which the three-judge district court need not follow, is 
seen as unbiased. The judges on three-judge district courts could ignore circuit 
law to rule in a more explicitly ideological way. But they would have to do so 
while explaining their reasons for departing from that circuit precedent, which 
otherwise would be persuasive (though not mandatory). The requirement that 
judges explain their decisions would hopefully temper most judges’ desire to 
ignore circuit precedent solely based on partisan motivation, as opposed to 
Courts of the United States, 12 NEVADA L.J. 787, 794–95 (2012) (noting that all circuits, “with the 
arguable exception of the Seventh Circuit,” follow a “law of the circuit” rule, while the Seventh Circuit 
allows one panel to overrule another but requires the court to circulate any such opinion to all active 
judges, who may then decide to take the case en banc). 
213. See FED. R. APP. P. 35 (addressing en banc review); Kannan, supra note 212, at 756. 
214. See Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r, 314 U.S. 326, 334–35 (1941) (noting that allowing 
circuit courts to sit en banc leads to “more effective judicial administration,” the avoidance of intra- 
circuit conflict, and the promotion of finality in the decisions of the circuit courts). 
215. As Professor Hellman demonstrates, however, circuit courts occasionally create intra-circuit 
conflict despite the prior-panel rule. See Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and Federal 
Appellate Structure, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1029, 1092–97 (1999). 
216. See Douglas, supra note 16, at 462, 467. 
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legitimate, jurisprudential reasoning. Of course, judges might analyze an issue to 
reach a desired outcome regardless of whether they are part of a three-judge dis-
trict court. A requirement that they follow circuit precedent might temper out-
come-determinative decisionmaking. There are thus competing interests on both 
sides. 
Congress’s goals should tip the balance: a major rationale behind the Three- 
Judge Court Act is that three minds at the trial level are better than one for these 
political cases to achieve greater legitimacy and independence.217 Requiring 
three-judge district courts to follow circuit precedent blindly, when the circuit 
cannot review the decision, detracts from the independence and value otherwise 
afforded by a trial panel in which three judges, rather than one, deliberate to reach 
an outcome in a politically charged case; it quite literally would take away the 
benefit of three minds deliberating anew on the most appropriate rule. Congress 
has designated certain kinds of cases as unique because of their subject matter. 
The rules of decisionmaking for these special tribunals should promote the rea-
sons behind their creation. 
Additionally, binding three-judge district courts with prior circuit precedent 
does not assist in finality in the same way as the prior-panel rule. The prior-panel 
rule exists in large part to avoid intra-circuit conflict so that district judges in the 
circuit will know the “law of the circuit,” thereby easing their decisionmaking 
process. A district judge will face certain reversal if he or she does not follow cir-
cuit precedent, at least by the three-judge panel that reviews the decision. Of 
course, a district court might note that it finds circuit precedent to be wrong, and 
it could call upon the en banc court to overrule that circuit law. But if the initial 
appellate panel is faithful to the prior-panel rule, it will necessarily reverse a dis-
trict judge that rules contrary to prior circuit caselaw. This leads to greater effi-
ciency for both the district court and the initial circuit court panel (not to mention 
the litigants). A three-judge district court, by contrast, will not face certain rever-
sal if it refuses to follow circuit law because the circuit court will not hear an 
appeal of its decision. Further, we are aware of no cases in which the Supreme 
Court reversed a three-judge district court simply for the lower court’s failure to 
follow circuit precedent. Thus, three-judge district courts do not need the finality 
of circuit law to operate efficiently. 
E. ONLY SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT BINDS THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS, BUT 
CIRCUIT LAW IS PERSUASIVE 
Having concluded, for both legal formalist reasons and prudential considera-
tions alike, that circuit court precedent does not bind three-judge district courts, 
we turn to our final question: what precedent does bind three-judge district 
courts? Supreme Court precedent, of course, binds all lower federal courts, 
whether based on constitutional or prudential rationales. But what precedent 
should three-judge district courts follow in a situation in which there is no 
217. See supra Section I.A. 
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Supreme Court caselaw directly on point, but where other lower courts have 
addressed the issue? Such a situation presents the crux of the problem. 
On the one hand, a three-judge district court, in this context, is essentially a 
free agent and should decide the case as it deems best in light of any persuasive 
authority from any source available. On the other hand, circuit precedent— 
although not formally binding—is highly persuasive, and three-judge district 
courts should follow it unless special reasons counsel against doing so.218 
Ultimately, three-judge district courts should not be required to follow circuit 
precedent, but they should consider carefully intra-court comity before they 
choose to depart from a prior ruling of the circuit court. A three-judge district 
court may validly disregard prior circuit law if there are “unusual or exceptional 
circumstances.”219 Such exceptional circumstances could include a fresh review 
of the age and persuasiveness of the precedent and any changes in the legal and 
social landscape since the circuit court ruled, including the presence or absence 
of subsequent circuit splits.220 Specific considerations relevant to reapportion-
ment or campaign finance cases may also provide justification for refusing to fol-
low circuit law. 
The practical effect of allowing three-judge district courts to depart from cir-
cuit precedent could be small. Many three-judge district courts will find circuit 
law highly persuasive and will choose to follow it even if they are not formally 
bound. But this shift in approach changes the kinds of arguments the litigants will 
make, as well as the judicial inquiry required of judges. Litigants would have the 
full suite of caselaw from across the country with which to make their arguments, 
which would be particularly helpful if there is unfavorable caselaw from their 
own circuit. Plaintiffs in voting rights cases, for example, might attempt novel 
218. Here and elsewhere we are primarily referring to substantive law issues, possibly subject to 
differing interpretations in different circuits. In contrast, we can imagine that the circuits might follow 
different standards on procedural issues such as evidentiary privileges or burdens of proof. As in other 
contexts, the line between the two may not always be clear, but there would be strong reasons of 
convenience and efficiency for a three-judge district court to follow the local circuit’s procedural rules, 
not directly related to the reapportionment, Voting Rights Act, or campaign finance issues that form the 
merits of the case. In any event, whether an issue is procedural or substantive, a three-judge district court 
should not consider circuit precedent to be formally binding. 
219. Cf. Kannan, supra note 212, at 755 n.6 (citing United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289, 923 
(S.D. Fla. 1980) (noting that district courts follow this rule for prior district court decisions)). 
220. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 174–75 (D.D.C. 2012) (three-judge court) 
(canvassing views of different circuits in a preclearance action under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
and then following the majority view), vacated on other grounds, 570 U.S. 928 (2013). 
An interesting and related question is whether, under our proposal, three-judge district courts should 
presumptively follow the decisions of other three-judge district courts. In theory, this would build up a 
body of law entirely separate from circuit law. We think that this development, as a formal matter, is 
unnecessary. For one, a three-judge district court cannot overrule a prior three-judge district court’s 
opinion; the courts are, by their very nature, sui generis. In addition, any prior decisions—by any 
court—on the same exact issue will always be persuasive to a subsequent court. But new legal 
developments or nuances in the facts could counsel a different result for a multimember tribunal sitting 
as a trial court, much in the same way that occurs with single district court judges all the time. A three- 
judge district court should therefore treat a prior three-judge district court ruling in the same way that a 
single district judge considers a prior single district judge’s decision. 
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arguments that a court in another part of the country has accepted, which can help 
the evolution of the substantive doctrine. Moreover, the three-judge district court 
will have to scrutinize more carefully the validity of prior rulings on the issue, 
which will give these courts greater independence, likely resulting in better deci-
sionmaking and potentially increasing confidence in the courts’ legitimacy. This 
independence might also lead three-judge district courts to reach different out-
comes in certain cases. More importantly, adopting this approach will unshackle 
three-judge district courts from the rigid rule that they must follow circuit prece-
dent, allowing three judicial minds to consider the question from a fresh perspec-
tive, which is exactly what Congress expected when creating these specialized 
courts. 
In sum, prior circuit court decisions may be highly persuasive, but they are not 
and should not be formally binding. Requiring three-judge district courts to fol-
low circuit precedent could undermine their perceived independence and legiti-
macy. No congressional or court rule requires these courts to follow circuit 
precedent. In fact, formal and prudential considerations point in the opposite 
direction. When faced with circuit law, the three-judge district court should con-
sider it carefully, but if it finds the prior caselaw unpersuasive, no formal rule or 
normative consideration requires unblinking adherence. 
CONCLUSION 
Both questions we have discussed in this Article—whether the Supreme 
Court’s summary affirmances of three-judge district courts are fully precedential 
and whether three-judge district courts must follow circuit precedent—signifi-
cantly impact the underlying substantive rights involved in these cases. 
Three-judge district courts decide disputes that involve the core concepts of our 
democracy, including democratic representation and campaign finance. Thus, how 
these courts operate plays a vital role in the very functioning of our democracy. 
The solutions we have proposed will give judges more flexibility in deciding 
these cases. The federal judiciary should serve as a backstop to overarching parti-
sanship in election rules.221 The Supreme Court’s practice with respect to sum-
mary affirmances is confusing and makes it hard for three-judge district courts to 
know which precedents actually bind them. In addition, the majority view that 
circuit precedent binds three-judge district courts hampers those courts’ ability to 
serve the primary role inherent in their creation: to provide greater deliberation 
and independent judgment through three judges at the outset of a case involving 
one of these core democratic topics. Assuming that Congress retains these speci-
alized courts, then the reforms we have proposed will streamline their procedure 
and ultimately will make their substantive decisionmaking stronger, which will 
augment the judiciary’s ability to ensure a fair election process.222 
221. See Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush 
v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865, 1868 (2013). 
222. The Court could also request that Congress repeal the direct appeal statute and either (1) replace 
it with certiorari-like procedures, or (2) repeal the reapportionment exception entirely. The latter move 
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We are simply calling for precedential rules in the three-judge district court 
context that make sense for judicial hierarchy and economy. The current practices 
are probably not a product of reasoned thought or deliberation but are more likely 
ad hoc methods to dispose of these cases. Close examination of these practices 
reveals how both the Supreme Court and three-judge district courts are off track. 
Reforming the precedential rules for three-judge district courts will go a long 
way toward ensuring that such courts perform the vital role that Congress 
intended in resolving the most difficult, political cases that the federal judiciary 
encounters.  
would leave intact three-judge district courts found in specific statutes, though those can be repealed as 
well. The Supreme Court was not shy about lobbying Congress to change the three-judge district court 
statute in the 1970s, see supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text, and it could do so again. Whether 
Congress would listen, however, is an entirely different matter. This is why our proposal takes the three- 
judge district court as a given, assuming that it will endure for the time being, and attempts to find ways 
to make it a more workable and coherent procedure for both litigants and the judicial system as a whole. 
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